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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 1 a foundational case in public 
employment law, prominently foreshadowed the coming prominence of 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in constitutional law. Under 
that doctrine, the Supreme Court limits a govemment actor, such as a 
government employer, from being able to condition govemmental benefits, 
such as public employment, on the basis of individuals' forfeiting their 
constitutional rights. It would thus seem to follow that a public employee 
should not have to sacrifice constitutionally protected rights in order to 
enjoy the benefits and privileges of public employment. Yet, today, that 
is far from the actual case. 
Rather, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied in a 
notoriously inconsistent manner over the last forty years , and not 
just in the public employment arena.2 Indeed, for jurists, scholars, 
and practitioners alike, the doctrine continues to be one of the thorniest 
issues in American constitutional law, and nowhere more so than in the 
context of public employment, where since the days of Pickering, the 
meaning of unconstitutional conditions for public employees has taken 
several dramatic, unpredictable, and less-than-beneficial tums.3 
The doctrine of uncon titutional conditions in public employment has 
figured most notably in Fir t Amendment free speech4 and freedom of 
association cases. 5 In the free peech context, the Court has developed 
the Connick!Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis.6 Taken together, 
1. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc. 391 U.S. 563 ( 1968). 
2. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocation?l Sanctions: The Problem of Negative ??????
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. ? ? ? ? 1293 1304 (19 4) (ob erving that unconstitutional 
conditions decision "manifest?? an incon ist?ncy so marked a to make a legal realist of 
almost any reader"). 
3. See Ja on Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 80 1, ? 0 (2003). 
4. See, e.g. , Garce??i v. Ceba llos, 547 U.S. 410, 4 17 (2006); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U .. 668 674 (1996)· Waters v. hu rchill ? ? ?U .. 661 , 671 
(1994) (plurality opinion); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 ( 19 7); Connick 
v. Myers 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983); Givhan v. W. Line 'onsol. ch. Dist. 439 U .. 
? ? ? ? 412-13 (1979); Mt. Heal thy City ell. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle 429 U . . 274 
284 (1977). 
5. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720 
(1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 
U.S. 507, 508 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S . 589,591-92 (1967). 
6. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 . 
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these three cases forbid public employers from taking adverse employment 
action again t employee for peaking out on "matters of public conce??,"7 
but only if the employee is not peaking pursuant to the employee's 
official duti es and lhen only if the employee can prevail under a 
constitutional balancing test.9 Needless to say, it is quite a gauntlet a public 
employe has to negotiate to ucceed on a First Amendment free speech 
claim. 10 
So why have Fi_r t Amendment public employee speech rights, which 
have traditionally enjoyed protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions suddenly diminished in recent years? 11 Three interrelated 
developments explain tbi tate of affairs. First, a jurisprudential school 
of thought termed the ' ubsidy school" has significantly undermined the 
vitality of the ???????????????? conditions doctrine through its largely 
successful sparring with an alternative school of thought, the "penalty 
chool." econd, although initially developed in the government-as-
sovereign context, this subsidy approach to the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine has now infiltrated the govermnent-as-employer context and 
eviscerated large parts of the Pickering holding. Third, and most 
significantly, the nature of the ubsidy argument in ??? government-as-
employer context ha morphed into the govemment speech doctrine, 
???????which the government employer claims the speech of its employees 
as it own and regulates it freely. It is this ?? t tep that I refer to as the 
Court's neoformalism in handling these con titutional is ues. 12 Instead 
7. See onnick, 461 U.S. at 143. The ourt's attemp? to define the meaning of 
matters of public concern" in Connick has alone led to an academic cottage industry. 
See Pau l M. ecunda ? ? ? (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The 
Constltutionafization ?f Public Employee Rights to ?????????? Non-Jntetference in 
Private ????????40 U. . DAVIS L. ???? 85, ?02 n. 2 (2006) (collecting ca e that di cuss 
the problems as ociatcd with the Connick "matter of public concern" test). 
8. See Garcetri 547 U .. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make 
statements ????????to their official duties ? ? ? employees are not spea\<ing as citizens for 
First Amend men! purpo cs, ??? the onstitl ttion doe not insulate ????? collliDunications 
from employer discipline.'). 
9. See Pickering, 391 U .. at 568. 
l 0. ee Paul M. Secunda Whither the Pickering Rights ??????????Employees? 79 
U. CoLO .. REv. 1101. 1107- 11 (200 ) (recounting the difliculty for public employees 
of ur iving the complicated five-step free speech analysis). 
11 . See Mazzone upra note 3 ?? 810- 16 reviewing a number of Supreme outt 
cases that establish that "[t]hc doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ha been ????
vigorously applied in the fi rst Amendment ca ?s"). 
12. Thi Article docs not claim any connection with any other fanner use of the 
word neofo??alism in the constitutional, contract or commercial law literature. ee, 
e.g., Jolm E. Murray. Jr. Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 7 1 FORDHAM 
909 
of merely applying a legal principle in a mechanistic or categorical 
manner, this new fom1 of fom1alism concems itself more with the fonnal 
ability of individuals to exercise constitutional rights, though practical 
realities may strongly suggest that cunent realities may significantly 
interfere with such rights . It is this neoformalism that explains how the 
once-vital doctrine of 1mconstitutional conditions has come under attack 
and the long-buried right-privilege distinction in constitutional law has 
reemerged. 
In order to more concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine and its recent distortions, this Article conducts an in-
depth exploration of the ca e that started it all : Pi ·kering v. Boctrd of 
Education.?? Although the ???? decided this ca in Marvin Pickering's 
favor, 14 th re ulting framework has, over the year. been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in a manner that significantly limits public employee 
free speech rights. In fact, this same unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
has been utilized in the government-a - overeign context to dilute other 
constitutional rights of citi.zens.15 What wa once developed to shut the 
door on the infamous right-privHege ? ? tinction16 has now been increasingly 
used to rob individuals of First Amendment and other constitutional 
rights. Indeed, when one also considers the neoformalist use of the 
government speech doctrine, the civil liberties of public employees in 
this area oflaw may be at an all -time low. 
This Article is divided into seven Parts . Part II defines and 
explores the development of the neofonnalist approach by a group of 
conservative Justices. Part III then delves into the story behind the 
dispute that led eventually to the Supreme Court's landmark penalty case 
of Pickering v. Board of Education, which established a robust fonn of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employee free speech 
L. R EV. 869, 89 1 (2002) (d iscussing methods for discerning busincs agreements and 
ob?igations)· Lawrence B. Solum, The upreme Courl in Bondage: ?????????????? ????
Decisis, Legal Formalism. and the Future of Unenume?????Rights 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
155, 159 (2006) (using the term to describe a revival of fo rmalist ideas in debating the 
role of precedent in consti tutional adjudication)· William J. Woodward Jr., Neoformalism in 
a Real ?????of Forms, 200 1 WI . L. REV. 97 1, 1004 (200 1) (examining ? ? ? ???????????
??????rules proposed in contract ?holars?ip would have on the diverse and complex 
real world of contract ). Neoformalism, a used herein, mean ?imply a new type of 
???????? ? thought that ha ? helped to revive the right-privilege dist·inction in public 
employment law. 
13. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
14. See infra Part III.A. 
15. See infra Part IV. 
16. See gener???? Will iam W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Righ?-Privilege 
Distinction in Con ??????????Law, 81 HARV. L. R EV. 1439, 1445- 5 (1968) (discussing 
various means by which the U. . Supreme Court has mitigated the "harsh con cquence 
of the right-privilege di tin tion"). 
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cases. Part IV then relates how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
first came under attack in the government-as-sovereign context through 
the increasing use of the subsidy line of argument by conservative 
Justices in these cases. Next, Part V describes the infiltration of the 
subsidy argument into the government-as-employer context post-Pickering 
and how the penalty version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
has been distorted by this emerging neoformalism. Part VI illustrates 
how this neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights has made 
the govemment less transparent and accountable because public employees 
are no longer secure in speaking their minds about their public employment. 
Con equently it argue ?? r the restoration of Pickering, its constitutional 
balancing tandard , and th p nalty ver ion of lhc w1con titutionaJ 
condition doctrin . Only when g vernment actions that practically 
truncate the con titutional right of public employee are not tolerated 
will public employees be able to again assume the role f the vanguard 
of the citizenry protecting fellow citizen ??om govemm nt fraud ?a te 
and abuse. 
II. NEOFORMALISM AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
A noted above th Supreme ourt limit a government actor from 
conditioning governmental b nefit ba ed on individual forfeiting their 
con titutional right under the doctrine of uncon titutional c ndition .17 
Yet through the recent a cendancy of tbe government peech doctrin in 
combination with the embrac of the . ubsidy version of the uncon titutional 
condition doctrine the Rehnqui t and Roberts ourt ha largely 
cvi cerated the protection again t government implementation f 
unconstitutional conditi n in distributing g vemmenllarge e. 
In thi regard th e ourt have adopted a new version f formali m 
or neoformalism to achieve the e end . Conceptually neoformali m 
refer to tho e legal theorists and judges who look for theirs ietal ideal 
in what ha come b fore: " rooted in the past- /a terre et /es morts- a 
maintained by Gennan hist??icists or French theocrats, or neo-
Conservatives in English-speaking coWltries." 18 However, whereas more 
17. See Mitchell N. Be rman, Coercion Without Baselines : Unconsritutiona{ 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. ??2- 3 (200 I). But see id. at 9 (criticizing 
the common definition of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as not being ve1y 
useful). 
18. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF M ANKIND: 
AN A NTHOLOGY OF E SSAYS 191 , 241 (Heruy Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 2000). 
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traditional forms of legal formalism seek to "identify ... foundational 
principles, deduce legal rules from them, [and] then apply those 
rules syllogistically to resolve individual disputes," 19 this new formalism 
concerns itself with the formal ability of individuals to exercise 
constitutional rights f?ee f?om physical restraint, though practical realities 
may suggest significant interference with the exercise of those rights. It 
is this neoformalism that explains how the once-vital doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions has come to languish. 
Take, for instance, the constitutional rights of public employees.20 
Through a number of decisions over the past four decades, the Supreme 
Court has drastically cut back on the ability of public employees to 
exercise rights to speech, privacy, and equal protection. In the First 
Amendment free speech context, the dynamic can be seen most plainly. 
In fact, the Court initiated a historical formalistic move in the case of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos by adopting the foundational p?inciple that public 
employees must be considered as either employees or citizens, but never 
both. 21 From that foundational principle, legal rules have been deduced 
such that public employees in their citizen role enjoy robust free speech 
protections,22 while those acting purely as employees have absolutely no 
such rights. 23 Finally, those rules are applied syllogistically in individual 
cases, so that employees who engage in speech pursuant to their official 
job description are automatically treated as individuals with no free 
speech rights and subject to employer discipline for their expression?4 
As others and I have argued elsewhere, this type of traditional 
formalism is troubling. 25 However, the neoformalism of the cu??ent 
19. Morgan loud The Four?h Amendme?? During rhe Lochner Era: Privacy, 
Proper?y. and ??berty in ??????????????The????48 TAN . . L. R EV. 555 567 ( 1996). 
20. This is an excepti.onally importam area for the uncon titutionaJ condition 
doctrine because "[a] common benefit be towed by the government is employment. 
Public employment therefore repre ents a con ?????opportunity for the government to 
persuade individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in exchange for a 
regular paycheck." See Mazzone supra note 3, at 81 0. 
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
22. See ity or an Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) ("[W]hen 
government employees peak or write n their own time on topics unrelated to their 
employment the speech can have first Amendment protection, absent some government 
justification 'far trongcr tha n mere peculation' in regulating it." (quoting United States 
v. a? '? Treasury Emp . Union, 513 U.S. 454,465 (1.995))). 
23. Garcetti,547U.S.at421-22. 
24. /d. at 421 ("[W?hen public employees make statements pursuant to their 
????????duties, the employee?? ?? not speaking a ???????? ???First Amendment purposes 
and the onstitution docs not in ulat? their conm1tmication from employer discipline."). 
25. ???, e.g., harles W. "Rocky? Rhodes, Public Employee peech Righls Fall 
Prey lo ? ? Eme?ging ????????? Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J . ?173, I ?74 
(2007); Paul M. ecunda, ????????'s lmpaci on the Firs/ Amendment Speech Rights of 
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDM ?T L. REV. 117, 123 (200 ). 
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Court is far more insidious and may potentially have a much larger 
impact on the constitutional rights of both public employees and all 
citizens. Neofonnalism's focus is on whether individuals' constitutional 
rights will be fonnally interfered with by the government's conditioning 
benefits on individuals taking certain actions. In other words, neoformalists 
emphasize the formal opporttmity that individuals have to exercise their 
constitutional rights without considering the practical realities of 
whether the government benefit program in question inappropriately 
penalizes individuals for the exercise of those constitutional right or 
makes it nearly impossible to exercise those rights given their personal 
circumstances. 
Neofonnalism can be seen as deriving most directly from an ongoing 
debate between two jurisprudential schools of thought about the 
longstanding and cryptic unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the penalty 
school and the subsidy school. The subsidy line of thought appears to 
derive from the belief that differential subsidization by the govemment 
is permissible as long a aformal opport??ity toe .erci e constitutional 
rights exists outside the program in another fon.tm. 26 ubsidy school 
adherents, mostly con ervative-oriented Ju tices, maintain that as long as 
individuals are not fo??ally compelled in not ex rcising their constitutional 
rights, the government is under no obligation to ubsidize the exerci e of 
those tights. Under this subsidy version of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, in contexts as different as abortion funding to the provision of 
tax exemptions to public employment, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine has become largely ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? in recent year becau e government 
actors simply compel a given result by aying they are doing nothing but 
subsidizing-or not sub idizing-a rigbt that a citizen or public employee 
already ha. under the Con titu.tion.27 Under thes circum ???????? if the 
government can constitutionally induce a result through the conditi ning 
26. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (applying the subsidy approach 
in the abortion-funding ?????????
27. See ? C v. League of Women Voters 46 U . . 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquisr 
J. di scnting) ("? W]hcn the Government i simply exercising it's power· to allocate it 
own public fund , [the Court) need on ly find that the condition imposed ha? a ????????
relation hip to Congress purpo e in pr vidi ng the subsidy and that i not primari ly 
'aimed at the ???????? ??? of dangerou ideas.'" (q uoting mmarano v. United taLe , 
358 U . . 498, 513 19 ??? Doug! a . J . concmring))): Regan v. Taxation wi th 
Reprc entation, 461 U .. 540, 544 (1983). 
913 
of a government benefit, it need not worry about directly compelling the 
result.28 
pecifically focu ing on the constitutional rights of public employee , 
the sub idy Justices are in e sen e aying that public employment is 
? ub idized' by the government and thu ? the government i entitled to 
say what it wi h through its government employee witboul worry of 
Fir t?Am ndment implication . Thi i ? ? ? meaning of the government 
speech doctrine in its neof??malistic form, and its most troubling aspect 
may be the reinvigoration of the long-ago dismissed right-privilege 
distinction in constitutionallaw.29 
Conversely, the penalty Justices in these same cases maintain just as 
strongly that such subsidization significantly and practically coerces 
individuals with regard to their constitutional rights. 30 So, under the 
penalty chool, traditionally adl1ered to by more progre sive Justice 
government may not penaJize individual for exercising constitutional 
rights by withdrawing various government benefit uch as tax exemption??
government funding, or public employment. ?? Ju lice Brennan maintained 
i11 one of the first of the e cases over fifty year ago, ' [the government 
program's] deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them 
for this speech."31 The seminal public employee free speech case of 
Pickering v. Board of Education is a penalty case and establishes a strong 
form of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 32 
Yet, since the days of Pickering, it appears that public employees are 
no longer being considered both employees and citizens.33 Under the 
Connick/Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis,34 public employers are 
28. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
29. Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better 
?????????? of the Pickering!Connick Thre hold Test, 50 V AND. L. REv. 993, 998 (1997) 
("Under the rights/privilege approach . . . . [t]he Court reasoned that since public 
employment i a privi lege granted by the government and not a right itself, the public 
employee could not during that employment, claim absolute rights otherwise guaranteed 
a private citizen. Th ref ore, freedom of speech, though established as a universal right 
in ? ? on titution, did not apply a such fo r those labeled 'employees."'). 
30. Rust, 500 U.S . at 216 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ("By suppressing medically 
pe1iinent infom1ation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to 
considerations of matemal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the 
path of Title X clients' freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment 
rights."). 
31. Speiserv. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,518 (1958). 
32. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U . . 563 (1968 . 
33. The ourt does however still pay lip service to the ideal. See, e.g., City of 
San Diego . Roc, 543 U.S. 77 , 0 (2004) (per curiam ("A government employee does 
not relinquish all first mendment rights othciWise enjoyed by citizens ju t by reason of 
his or her employment." (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605- 06 
(1967))). 
34. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138 (1983); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
914 
[VOL. 48: 907, 2011] Neoformalism 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
only forbidden from taking adverse employment action against 
employees for speaking out on "matters of public concem. "35 However, 
if the employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties , they lose 
all constitutional rights in their speech.36 The Court has achieved this 
reintroduction of the right-p1ivilege distinction into the law by contending in 
its more recent public employee free speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos 
that the govemment employer is not conditioning public employment on 
the public employees' forfeiting their rights to speech but instead is 
merely requiring its speech-in the mouth of its employee-be used to 
promote the particular policies for which the employee was hired. 37 
This A1ticle therefore suggests that the First Amendment public 
employee speech rights, which have traditionally enjoyed protection 
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, have suddenly diminished 
in recent years through the largely successful jurispmdential sparring 
between the subsidy school and the penalty school. In order to more 
concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
and its recent dist01tions by these neofonnalistic trends, this Article first 
conducts an in-depth exploration of the penalty case of Pickering v. 
Board of Education.38 Although the Court decided this case in Marvin 
Pickering's favor, the resulting framework has, over the years, been 
interpreted by the Supreme ????? in a manner that significantly limits 
public employee free speech rights. To understand its erosion in the 
government-as-employer context, however, it is first necessary to 
understand the growing preeminence of the subsidy school of thought in 
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its 
sovereign capacity. It is those principles from the sovereignty context 
that have now infiltrated the government employment context and 
explain the resulting neoformalism that has taken hold there and cut 
away vast amounts of constitutional protections for public employees. 
In both sovereignty and employment contexts, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, once developed to shut the door on the infamous 
right-privilege distinction, has now been resurrected to rob individuals of 
First Amendment and other constitutional rights. 
35. See Connick, 461 U.S . at 142. 
36. See Garcelli, 547 U.S . at 421. 
37. !d. at42J - 23. 
38. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 . 
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Ill. PICKERiNG V. BOARD OF EDUCAT?????9 
Marvin Pickering is n w an energetic and spirited septuagenarian. In 
1964 he was a recently mjnted bigh school science teacher with a strong 
desire to teach tudent and an idealistic view on the ?????????? of 
citizen engagement in representative government. He never expected 
that his name would one day become synonymous with the U.S. Supreme 
???????most important modem case on public employee speech rights. 
A. The Background Events Leading to Pickering 
As a y ung man ????ering made his way to lllin i and did his 
tudent ????????at Downer Grove oulh High chool in !he suburb of 
Chicago. That experi ?n e was foJlowed by the c mpletion of hi fir t 
year of teaching cience at Lyons Town hip South High cho I at o in 
the Chicago suburbs. 
In 1959, Lockport Township Central High School hired Pickering to 
teach science.40 He was twenty-three years old. In the next five years, 
he became active in community and school politics. During that time, he 
often attended the Board of Education of Township High School District 
205 (Board) ???????? and became familiar with the problems the Board 
was having in addre sing variou chool-related issues, ?????????how to 
deal with a rapidly growing student population and the need to raise 
taxe to build new facilities. By 1964, !he Board and other teachers 
knew that Pickering was one who freely spoke his mind on a variety of 
topics, especially when he thought some chool policy wa unfair. TI1e 
dispute between Pi keri.ng and the Board over how tbe latter was 
spending funds on alh letic rather than on chool material and teacher 
salaries seemed to be just another instance f Pickering's peaking his mind 
on something about which he passionately cared. 
That dispute, however, tumed out to change the constitutional landscape 
for millions of public employees in the United States. On October 8, 
1964, the Board of Education of Township High School District 205 in 
Will County, Illinois, fired teacher Marvin Pickering for writing a 
blistering editorial about the Board and Superintendent published in the 
39. Unle s otherwise indicated, the underlying story in this Part i drawn from the 
?????? ing sources: Picker???? 39 1 U . . 563?Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 225 .. 2d ? (Ill. 
1967), rev 'd, 91. U .. 563; Transcript of Oral Argument' Pickering, 39 ?U .. 563 (No. 
510); Marvin L. Pickering, Marvin L. Pickering- The Man unpublished autobiography) 
(on file with author); and ?????? from Marvin Pickering to Pau l ??????? Assoc. 
Profes or of Law, Mnrqueuc Univ. Law 'ch. (Mar. 5 20 ?0 7:50 ST) (on ? ? ? ? with 
author). 
40. Township High School ????????205 is located in the town of Lockport, Illinois, 
near the city of Joliet, about an hour southwest of Chicago. 
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local Lockport Herald.41 The letter addres ed a eric of four tax 
referenda initiated and upported by the Board f Education, which 
ought to allocate tax money for a variety of chool-related purpo es.42 
Pickering believed that ? ? ? Board and Superintendent had ??????? the 
matter and that tax money wa better spent on teacher?? alary funding 
for hoollunchc for nonathlete and educationa l need generall y. 
He wrote in pertinent part, in this letter to the editor of eptember 24, 
1964: 
Dear Editor: 
I enjoyed reading the back issues of your paper which you loaned to me. 
Perhaps others would enjoy reading them in order to see just how far the two 
new high schools have deviated from the original promises by the Board of 
Education .. .. 
ince there seems to be a problem gelling all the facts to the voter on the twice 
defeated bond issue, many lcllcrs have been written to this pap r and probably 
more will follow, J feel I mu t ay something about tl1e letters and their writer . 
Many of the e I ttcrs did not give the whole story. ??????? by your B ard and 
Administration have tntcd that tcachet.' alarie total 1,297,746 for one year. 
Now that mu t have been th total payroll, otherwise the teacher would be 
getting ?0,000 a year. I teach at the high chool and ? know this just i ·n't the 
case. llowcver, this hows their 'stop at nothing ' atti tude. To illustrate fi.trther, 
do you know that the superintendent told the t?ach?? and I quote ? ?? teacher 
that oppose the referendum hould be prepared for the consequcnc ??. ' I think 
41. Pick ring' editorial was publi hed n September 24, 1964, just two weeks 
prior to his firing. Letter from Marvin Pickering to Editor, Lockport Herald (Sept. 24, 
1964) (on file with the Lockport Public Library). As discussed below, the lllinois 
?upreme ourt reproduced the letter in whole in irs majority opinion in Pickering. At 
the time, the Lockport Herald had 2900 ub cribcr ? See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 39. 
42. There were four such referenda involving simila r issues over a three-year 
period. In early 1961, 
the voters of the school district turned down a proposal for the issuance of 
$4,875,000 in school building bonds to erect two new schools to accommodate 
freshmen and sophomores only to feed existing Lockp??t Central High School, 
which was then to accommodate j uniors and seniors only. Upon defeat, this 
program wa discarded. 
Pickering, 225 ? ????at 2. Subsequently, later in 1961, 
the v ters approved the issuance of such bonds in the amount of $5,500,000 to 
erect two new chools, one (Lockport East) to accommodate freshmen and 
sophomores only, which was to operate as a feeder school to Lockport Central, 
and the other (LockpOJt West) to be a full four year high school. Existing 
Lockport Central was then to accommodate juniors and seniors only on the 
East side of the district. 
/d. "In 1964, proposals to increase the educational and ?????????????? tax rates were 
twice defeated, on May 23 and on September 19." Jd. at 8 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). 
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this gets at the reason we have problems passing bond issues. Threats take 
something away; these are insults to voters in a free society. We should try to 
sell a program on its merits, if it has any. 
As I see it, the bond is ue is a fight between the Board of ducmion that is 
?????? to push ???x-support?d aU1lctic down our throats with educa tion, and a 
public that has mix d emotions about both of these items bcca u e they feel they 
are already ??????enough iaxes and imply don 't know whom to trust with any 
more tax money . 
I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher, since 
that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration. Do you 
really know what goes on behind those stone walls at the high school? 
Respectfully, Marvin L. Pickering.43 
So, in summary, the superintendent of the Lockport schools, Dr. 
William Blatnick, had first sent a letter to the editor of the local newspaper 
in support of one of the tax referenda. Pickering responded with the 
letter above, with many accusations of misfeasance and suggesting the 
Board was placing athletics above teachers' salaries and education 
generally. Not surprisingly, the Lockpmt School Board viewed Pickering's 
public statements as insubordination. The Board decided to dismiss 
Pickering on October 8, 1964, but did hold a hearing on the dismissal, as 
required under the Illinois state tenure law. 
The same seven-member, elected Lockpmt School Board that had 
already decided to dismiss Pickering held a hearing over two days in the 
Lockport East High School library in November 1964. Of course, 
Pickering was not surprised when the Board unanimously decided, on 
December 7, 1964, to terminate him because the Board acted as judge, 
????? and prosecutor during the hearing. The Board concluded that 
numerous statements in the letter were false and it was in the "best 
interests of his school" to dismiss him from employment.44 
Pickering's last day of employment was the beginning of Christmas 
vacation, 1964. During his time away from Lockport Central High 
School, which period would end up lasting nearly five years, Pickering 
initially worked for the Campbell Soup Company as a food processing 
supervisor and then later in the Uniroyal-Joliet Arsenal in the Production 
Training Department. 
43. !d. at 2-4 (majority opinion). Much of the lllinois Supreme Court majority 
decision is spent ?????? to establish that Pickering's allegations were false or misleading 
and therefore the Board 's termination of his employment had been justified because he 
had not acted in the "best interests" of the school when he wrote this letter. !d. at 4-7 
("A teacher who displays disrespect toward the Board of Education, incites 
misunderstanding and distrust of its policies, and makes unsupported accusations against 
the officials is not promoting the best interests of his school, and the Board of Education 
does not abuse its discretion in dismissing him."). 
44. !d. at 6-7. 
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After being terminated from his $6900-per-year school teaching job,45 
Pickering did not take the School Board's actions against him lying 
down. He first petitioned the Board and delivered 1260 signatures in 
support of his continued employmeot.46 Next, he contacted the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) at it Chicago national headquarter .47 
The AFT pledged a fight to the fini h for his cause.48 The AFT appointed 
well-known civil rights litigator John Ligtenberg, of Chicago s Ligtenb rg 
Goebel & DeJong, to defend him.49 
Pickering, then twenty-eight years old, challenged the Board's 
termination decision in the Will County Circuit Court in January 1965, 
arguing that his free speech rights had been violated by the Board's 
actions. 5° At the time, Pickering stated, "A man doesn't give up his right 
to freedom of speech when he becomes a school teacher."51 Superintendent 
Blatnick responded: "We don't question his right to write letters. We 
just say that they should be ????statements. "52 
In March 1966, white Pickering was still working at Campbell Soup, 
Will County Circuit Court Judge Michael A. Orenic held in favor of the 
45. Nonnan Glubok, Teacher Who Lost Job for Speaking Out Will Sue Board, 
WA II. P T Dec. 21 1964, at 15. 
46. Pickering, supra n tc 39. 
47. ''(The AFT's 1 activity in niding individual teachers in academic ??eedom 
disput ha been d hoc in nature, limited to supplying legal and financial aid for 
teachers eeking relief in the ???????? Developments in the ????????????Freedom, 81 
? ? ? ? ? L. REv. 1045 1121 (1968) (citing ?????? from John Ligtenberg, Gen. oun el 
Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to th llorvard Law Review (D c. 22 1967) (on file with the 
Harvard Law Review)). 
48. Union To ???? Fired ???????in ourt Fight, HI . TRI?. Jan. 15, 1965 at 09. 
49. John Ligtcnberg was ?? o the general coun el of the FT ??? the time. !d. 
Ligtenberg already had a national reputation, having ubmitted an amicu brief for the 
AFT in Brown v. Board of Educarion, 347 U. . 4 3 ( 1954). He would later go on to 
argue the important due proces employment law case of ????? v. indermann 408 U .. 
593 1972), which extended due pr cc ?? protection to tcnnination of govemmcnt 
employees, and to submit amicu briefs in ????????Board of Education . Lafleur, 414 
U.S. 632 ( 1974), n brief with now-Ju tice Ruth Dadcr Gin burg, which struck d wn a 
re tricrive matcmity leave requirement that effectively served to puni h women for 
exer i ing their right to bear children, and Board of Regents v. Roth 408 U.S. 564 
(1972) which found a university teacher plaintiff did not have a prop rty inlerc ?  in 
continued employment. 
50. Fired Teacher Files Sui?To Be Reinsrated ? ? ? TRIB. Jan. 7, 1965, at W3 . 
51. Glubok, supra note 45 . 
52. Jd. 
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Board.53 Judge Orenic concluded that "[t]he greater public interest of 
the schoo Is ovenides the issue of freedom of speech rights of a teacher. "54 
Pickering then bypassed the Illinois Appellate Court and filed for 
review of the Circuit ???????decision with the Illinois Supreme Court. 
He based his challenge on free speech and denial of due process claims 
under the First and Fomieenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
After oral argument of the case in November 1966, on January 19, 1967, 
the Illinois Supreme Court decided in a 3-2 decision55 in favor of the 
Lockport School Board. Justice Ray I. Klingbiel, for the majority, held 
that the school need not "continue to employ one who publishes 
misleading statements which are reasonably believed to be detrimental 
to the schools. "56 Yet, in a stinging dissent, Justice Walter V. Schaefer 
found that "the State and Federal constitutions require a more precise 
standard than 'the interests of the schools. "'57 Justice Schaefer also took 
the majority to task for deferring to the factfinding of the very Board that 
fired Pickering and for not pointing to any evidence that Pickering knew 
that any of the statements he made in his letter to the editor were false. 58 
He concluded by stating that "[t]o be entitled to the protection of the first 
amendment it is not necessary that the plaintiffs letter be a model of 
literary style, good taste and sound judgment. In my view it is not, but 
my view is irrelevant."59 After his defeat at the Illinois high court, 
Pickering filed a petition for ce1iiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court. The Court granted certiorari, noting probable jurisdiction, on 
November 6, 1967. 
B. Pickering at the US. Supreme Court 
Oral argument in the case took place on March 27, 1968. The oral 
argument lasted for some forty-nine minutes. 60 John Ligtenberg, for 
Pickering, framed the argument as a pure First Amendment question of 
whether a public school teacher had the constitutional right to criticize 
the School Board and its policies in the local press. In this regard, he 
53. Court Upholds Board's Firing of Teacher, CHI. TR!B., Mar. 4, 1966, at Bll. 
54. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. The Illinois Supreme Court nmmally has seven justices, but there were two 
vacancies at the time of the Pickering case. Of the five justices who heard the case, the 
? ? ? ? ? justices in the majority were Republicans, and the two dissenting justices were 
Democrats. Pickering, supra note 39. 
56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). 
57. ld. at 7 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). 
58. I d. at 7-8. 
59. I d. at 10. 
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39. 
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maintained that public employees had constitutional rights just like 
ordinaJy citizens and h uld not have to forfeit them just because they 
became government employee . Ligtenberg cited the recently decided 
Ke ish ian v. Board of Regent loyally oath ca e for lhi propo ition.61 
He al o pointed out that even if ome of Pickering written tatements 
were false, they nevertheless served the important fun ?ion of helping 
the public arrive at the truth of the matter. 
John F. irri ione argued th ca e for the Lockport chool Board. His 
argument like the Illinois upreme Colllt opinion, focu ed on the alleged 
harm Pickering' tatement cau d to the uperintenclent, Board and 
fellow teachers who supported the tax increase referenda. In essence, 
Ci??icione maintained the essential falsity of Pickering's statements in 
the letter, though he did not allege the statements were knowingly false. 
He also contended that because Pickering was negligent in his allegations, 
the school district had the ability to terminate him so that the efficiency 
of its services to the public would not be undermined. This argument 
gave little weight to Pickering and his First Amendment speech rights 
and concentrated instead on the control that an employer should have 
over an employee in such circumstances.62 
In an 8- 1 decision63 written by Ju lice Thurgood Marshall, the Court 
held ???? Pickering had a Fir t Amendment right to free speech that 
could not be forfeited to rvc the 'be t interests" of the school district.64 
Although Justice Marshall recognized that the government's relationship 
61. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regent 385 U . . 5 9 (1967). 
62. A number of the U. . Suprem ourt .JuS1i -es ccmed highly keptical during 
oral argument that tJte medium of communication (oral versu ??????? or the audience 
for the communication (leachet ver us the genera l public) hould make any difference 
whatsoever. See Transcript f Oral Argument, supra note 39. f cou e, Justice 
Marshall' opinion for the majority in Pickering pecifically found that uch differences 
in mode and manner of public employee speech did not warrant different legal tandards. 
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U .. 563, 574 ( 196 ). 
63. Ju Lice White wrote an opinion that con urred in part and di ented in part . 
Pickering 391 U .. at 82- 84 (White J . ?concu??ing in ? art and ??? enting in part). 
Alth ugh Ju Lice White agreed with the majority holding that Pickering had the right to 
auth r the letter, h wrote n partial dissent to ??? he di agreed that ????????? ?????
comments that cau ·e no ???? hould al o be protected by the First Amendment. /d. 
64. See id. at 565 567 (majority opinion); see al?? ????????Extend Teachers? Fr e 
Speech Rights 1 .Y. T?MES June 4, 1968, at 24 ('Public hool teacher ??? not be 
discharged for good-faith criticism of school officials, even if some f the charge arc 
false, the uprcm Court ruled today."). 
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to individuals was necessarily different in the employment context,65 he 
nevertheless finnly stated that public employees have constitutional 
rights, including rights to free speech.66 
If public employees retain their First Amendment rights, the question 
is then, How should the Court balance each of the parties' competing 
interests? Justice Marshall described the appropriate balance this way: 
The problem in any case is to ?????? at a balance between the interests of the 
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.67 
To be clear, the governmental interests recognized in Pickering are not 
in any sense constitutional rights but rather are interests that government 
employers have in maintaining "a significant degree of control over their 
employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little 
chance for the efficient provision of public services."68 The balance 
undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government 
employer perf01ms "important public functions"69 and consequently 
possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity tban in it sovereign 
capacity???0 "a citizen who works for the government i nonetbele a 
citizen.??? Consequently, the First Amendment ???? limit the ??????? of 
the public employer to condition employment of that employee on the 
forfeiture of his or her constitutional rights under this doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions. 72 
Important considerations in carrying out the Pickering balance include 
whether the public employee's speech impairs discipline by superiors, 
harmony among coworkers, close working relationships for which 
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or the performance of the 
65. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests 
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in 
general."). 
66. Jd. at 565. 
67. ld. at 568. 
68. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006) (comparing to Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983), which found that "government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter"). 
69. Pickering 39 1 U.S. at 568. 
70. Garcet?i, 547 U.S. at41 8 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 , 671 (1994) 
(plurality opinion)}; see a/so ERW?N CHEMER?NSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND PoLl IES Ill 0 (3d ed. 2006) ("[S]peech by public employees is clearly less 
protected than other speech."). 
71. Garceui, 547 U.S . at 419. 
72. See id. ( 'The Firs? Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to 
leverage the employment relationshiJ to ? ? trict incidentally or intentionally, the libetties 
employees enjoy in their capacities a private citizens." (citing Pe??? v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 597 (1972))) . 
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emp loyee dutie or the regular operation of the enterprise.73 In 
Pickering it elf, the balancing cam out in favor of Pickering because 
(1) th tatements in the letter related to matter of public concern-
whether the cbool sy tem required additional f??d for tran portation 
and other educational need ? (2) no evidence exi ted that the statement 
inte1fered with Pickering's job duties or with the operation of the school 
in general and (3) he wa peaking in his capacity a a private citizen.74 
In uch in tance , Justice Mar hall concluded that 'it i nece sary to 
regard [Pickering] as the member of th general public he seeks to be.' 
Perhap equally important, the Court majority in Pickering al o noted 
how critica l it wa to allow public employee , lik Pickering to speak 
out on matters of public concern becau e uch employees are at many time 
in the be t po ition to have "informed and definite opinion . '76 [n other 
word , public employe help to en ure the transparency and accountability 
frcpre entative, democratic government . Public employee wi ll peak 
out on matter· of govemment abu ??? waste or fraud, but only if they are 
a ???? that they do not ri k tho e very job every time they p ak. 
Unfortunately more recent ca ?? developments in e Pickering sugge l 
that the upreme Court ha not focused enough on thi important a pect 
of the Pickering decision. The initial unraveling of thi ·trong?? tatement 
of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine in the government-as-
employment context finds its root in parallel developments in the 
government-as-sovereign context. 
IV. UNCONSTITUTJONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT 
ACTS AS SOVEREIGN 
Public employee free speech rights reached their zenith as a result of 
the Pickering holding. Yet, the seeds of their destmction were already 
being planted in the parallel context of the unconstitutional conditions 
73. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U .. 563, 569- 73 (1968). 
74. See id. at 571-73. Here, it can hardly be doubted that expre ly signing the 
leller "a a cilizen, taxpayer nnd voter, not as a teacher " see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
225 .E.2d ? 4 Ill. 1967) (emphasis added), immeasurably helped Pickering under the 
tandard developed by the ?????
75. Pickering 91 U . . at 574. 
76. /d. at 572 ('Teacher are . .. members of a community most likely to have 
????????and dcfinit opinions as to how fund allotted to the operations of the schools 
hould be spent. Accordingly it i essential that they be able to speak out freely on such 
question without fear of retaliatory di mi al."). 
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doctrine when the government acts as a sovereign towards its citizen. 
Importantly, in those cases, the penalty-subsidy debate among the 
Justices shaped the modern contours of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. As will be illustrated, the holdings in the government-as-
sovereign cases have now slowly infiltrated into the government-as-
employer context, primarily through the doctrinal innovation ofthe 
government speech doctrine. After reviewing the government-as-sovereign 
precedent, the Article will therefore discuss how the penalty-subsidy 
jurisprudential divide has come to shape the Com1's modern treatment of 
public employee speech law. 
A. The Historical Foundations of the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions existed in various forms 
before Marvin Pickering's fateful showdown with the Lockport School 
Board. Not only had the doctrine been applied the year before in a seminal 
loyalty oath case involving a public university professor, Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents?7? but it has since been applied to a wide variety of 
constitutional cases. These cases involved tax exemptions,78 users of 
public facilities?9 and recipients of government subsidies.80 In these 
cases, the Court initially pushed back against government attempts to 
condition receipt of government largesse based on forfeiture of citizens ' 
constitutional rights. 81 
So where does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions find its 
judicial roots? Although not rooted in any single clause of the Constitution, 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a creature of judicial 
implication.82 In its simplest terms, the doctrine prohibits the government 
77. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regent , 385 U.S. 5 9, 609 ( 1967) tr iking down state 
law prohibiting employment of public school tea hers who advocate overthrowing U. . 
government a a ?????????of employee? ' rights to free association). 
78. See, e.g., Spei er . Randall , 357 U.S. 5 13 (195 ). 
79. See, e.g., Lamb s hapel v. tr. Morichc Un ion Free ch. Dist. 508 U .. 384 
395- 96 (I 993) (ho lding uncon ?itutional a law that allowed the school district to deny 
the church u e of its ??? pe1ty to how religious fil m ); Healy . James, 40 U .. 169, 
187- 88 ( 1972) (holding that a state colleg campu may not, con i ???? with the first 
Amendment, deny recognition to a tuden t organization based on poli ti.ca l affiliation). 
80. See, e.g. FC v. League of Women Voters, 46 U .. 364 ( I 984). 
8 1. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Condition ? State ? ? ? ? ? ? and the 
limits o/ Consent, ?02 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7 ( 1988) (noting that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine "has ?????????courts and commentator alike"). 
82. !d. at 10-11. 
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from onditi ning a beoefit based on forfeiture of an individual' 
con titutional right.83 
The doctrine of uncon titutional condition fir t enjoy d widespread 
u e in the early part of the twentieth centuty when the Lochner ourt84 
initially developed conomic ub? tantive due proces .85 Under tbi form 
of sub tantive due proce s the Lochner Court empha ?ized property 
rights and the freedom to contract.86 But with the a cendancy of 
Roo evelt ew Deal ourt in the late 1930s and the ovemtling of 
rnuch o[ the Lochner Court's ub tantive due proce jurisprudence in 
the en uing period 87 the doctrine f uncon titutional condition went 
through a. ubstantial period of disu e. 
ub equ ntly, the Warren ourt renewed the uncon titutional 
condition doctrine in a number of ca e involving ivil libertie . Many 
of the ·e ca es invol ed the g vernment in it role a overeign, seek ing 
to induce certai n preferred out ome through u e of government 
ub idie and tax exemptions. ?? the e ca e ? the government ought to 
83. Kathleen M. Sullivan ????????????????Conditions 102 HARV. L. R.EV. 1413, 
141 , 1421- 22 (1989) (''Uncon ?????????? conditions problem ari e when government 
offers ? benefit on condition that the recipient pcrfonn or forego an activity thnt a 
preferred con titutional right nonnally protect from government interference."). 
84. ee Lochner v. ew York, 198 U .. 45, 56- 57 (1905) (utili7Jng a ·ub tantive 
due proc analysis to trik down maximum hour law for bakers becau e of it 
"arbitra?y interfer nee with the right of the individual to his personal liberty''). The 
Lochner ourt con titutionalized prop rty right and the liberty to contract under a 
?????? of economic ubstantive due process as a means to strike down much social 
welfare legi ?? ion during the first part of rhe twentieth century. ee Michael J. Phillips, 
The Slow Return of Economic ubstantive Due Process, 4 SYRA ? E L. REV. 917,919-
20 ( 1999); see al o Gregory M. tein, Nuance and Complexiry in Regulatory Takings 
? ? ? 15 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 389 395 (2006) (noting that the Lo /mer Court 
protected propet1y right at the ex pen ·e or popular government). 
85. Economic ub tantivo due pr ces commonly refers to the con titutionali7.ation 
of an economic lib rtarian judicial phi losophy through u e of the substantive component 
of the Du Process ??use of the Fif?h and Fout1eenth Amendments. ee ??????? , supra 
note 84, at 918 n.5, 91 - 20. 
6. See id. at 919- 920. ? ? d ctrinc of uncon titutional condition can tcchniea!Jy 
be found ????? in Doyle v. ???????????????????? Co., 94 U. . 535 ? 76): "Though a 
' tate may have the power, if it sees ??? to subject it citizens to the inconvenience of 
prohibiting all foreign corporation from tran ·acting busines withi11 its juri diction1 it 
ha no power to impose ???????????????? conditions upon their doing so." /d. at 543 
(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
87. Indeed. Lochner it elf came into disfavor during thi time. See Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U .. 5 9 597 (1977 ("The holding in Lochner has been implicitly rejected many 
time ." citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U . . 113, 117 (1973); Gri wold v. Connecticut, 381 
U .. 479, 4 1- 2 1965); Ferguson v. krupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); ???
Darlington Inc. 35 U .. 4, 91- 92 (1959))). 
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utilize its Spending Clause powe??8? to award government largesse to 
individuals in return for these individuals' agreeing to conditions that 
burdened their exercise of constitutional rights. 89 In such cases, the 
question became, "[W]hen government conditions a benefit on the 
recipient's waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the 
conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on 
a prefened liberty?"90 
B. The Penalty-Subsidy Debate 
In answering this foundational question, a considerable amount of 
dissonance has historically existed between two groups of Justices, and 
indeed two different schools of jurisprudential thought have sprung up 
concerning how to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. So-
called liberal or progressive Justices construe the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine more expansively and generally find that conditions 
placed on government benefits represent a penalty on the exercise of 
individual rights protected by the Constitution. As such, these conditions 
are subject to strict scrutiny and are usually found unconstitutional. 91 In 
contrast, the subsidy group of conservative Justices narrowly construes 
the doctrine and finds most government conditions to be mere "subsidies." 
As such, these conditions are subjected to rational basis review and are 
generally upheld as constitutional; although individuals have the right to 
exercise their constitutional rights, they do not have a right to have those 
rights subsidized.92 
1. Penalty Cases 
The contours of the penalty-subsidy debate can first be seen in the 
1958 case of Speiser v. Randall. 93 In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that the State of California could not condition veteran tax exemptions 
88. The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states, "The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. 
ONST. art. l § 8, cl. I . 
89. Congress ? allowed to provide incentives under its Spending Clause powers, 
but it may not coerce federal ??????? recipients througb this power. See South Dakota v. 
Dole, 4 3 U.S. 203, 210 ( ? 87) (' [T]he [spending] power may not be used to induce the 
tales to engage in activitic that would themselves be unconstitutional.") . 
90. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1415. 
91. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,547-49 (2001); FCC 
v. League of' Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,380,402 (1984). 
92. See, e.g., Ru?t v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); Regan v. Taxation 
withRepr sentation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977). 
93. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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on individual declaring that they did not advocate the violent ovetihrow of 
the government.94 rn this regard Justice Brennan stated for the majority 
that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain form 
of peecb i in effect to penalize them for uch peech. lt deterrent 
effect is the arne as if the Stat were to fine them for thi speech. 95 Ln 
the first hint of the debate to come Ju tice lark writing in di ·ent? 
found that th tax exemption program for veteran wa in n nsc a 
penalty and instead alifornia wa m rely "declining to xtend the 
grac of the tate to app ? ?ant . "96 
In an ther penalty ca e ver twenty-five year later the ourt truck 
down a govemment sub. idy program in FCC v. L eague of Women 
Voters of ?????????????? There plaintiff: challenged ection 39 of the 
Corporation for Public Broadca ting Act,98 which conditioned publi 
broadcasting ub idie based on nonconunercial educational broadcaster 
agreeing not to editorialize.99 Justice Brennan found that secti.on 399 
violated the Fir t Amendment rights of broadca ter b cau e the law' 
ban n editorializing far exceeded what wa neces ary to protect against 
the ri k of governmental interference with th ? political proce .100 In 
other w rds, Ju tice Brennan applied a trict level of scruliny to thi law 
becau e it burdened the First Amendment rights of broad a ter .101 
Although the government may have had a vital interest in regulati ng 
94. /d. at 51 . In Speiser al?fornia sought to have all veteran eeking a c rtain 
tax exemption sign a declaration that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United 
rates by force or violence or other unlawful mean . ld at 515. 
95. ld. at 518. 
96. Id at 541 ( lark J., dis enting). Thi idea of declining to extend legis??tive 
"grace" has been recently repeated by hicf Ju. tice Robert in Engquist v. Oregon 
Department of ???????????? 553 U. . 591, 607 (2008): "(A) government dcci ion to 
limit the abi lity of public employers to fire at will i an act of legi lative grace, not 
con tit\Jtional mandate." 
97. F v. League of Women Voters 46 U .. 364 (1984). 
98. /d. at 366; see 47 U .. ·. § 399 (2006). 
99. League of Women Voters, 468 .. at 366. 
?00. Jd at 395. Then-Ju tice Rehnquist for hi part, di sen ted in League of Women 
Voters ba cd on his belief that the ?ame analysis utilized in Regan v. Taxation ????
Repre. ?entation, ·ee di cu sion infra Part 1V.B.2 should have appli d. ? ? ? ? ? ? of Women 
Voters, 468 U .. at 40 (Rehnqu ist, J. di senting). pecifically, he argued that both 
ca involved government allocation of public moneys as it desired and that ueh 
allocati n hould not be disturbed if the government is able to h w tha? the ub. idy is 
rationally related to it govemmental purpo c. !d. at 407. 
l 0 ?? L ?ague of Women Voters, 46 U .. nt 3 5 (majority opinion) arguing that th 
govemment regulation was overbroad and not crafted with ufficient precision to remedy 
the danger that the government ought to addrcs ). 
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public broadcasters, Justice Brennan was unconvinced that the means by 
which the govemment attempted to accomplish its aims were narrowly 
tailored. 102 
More recently, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, Justice Kennedy 
found that the federal law in question unreasonably interfered with the 
First Amendment rights of lawyers participating under the Legal Service 
Corporation (LSC) program. 103 Under that program, LSC attomeys 
could be prohibited from being involved in litigation challenging the 
validity of existing welfare laws for constitutional or statutory reasons 
when representing an indigent plaintiff in a welfare dispute.104 Specifically, 
Justice Kennedy found that govemment "may not design a subsidy to 
effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attomeys 
and the functioning of the judiciary."105 The government subsidy, in 
short, had crossed the line from a mere subsidy to an unconstitutional 
condition that coerced individuals in the exercise of their First Amendment 
rights. 106 
2. Subsidy Cases 
Although subsidy arguments can be viewed in cases as early as 
Speiser, 107 the rise of the subsidy argument appears to mostly coincide 
with the rise of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and their conservative 
judicial philosophy. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
102. !d. 
103. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,549 (2001). 
I 04. See id. at 537-38 . 
105. !d. at 544. 
? 06. See id. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia, found that the 
program was merely a subsidy and did not interfere with the indigent plaintiffs right to 
bring a welfare claim. See id. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) . In this regard, Justice 
Scalia stated that "[t]he [LSC] provision simply declines to subsidize a certain class of 
litigation, and ... that decision 'does not infringe the right' to bring such litigation." !d. 
at 553-54 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). Although Justice 
Kennedy, for the majority, was concerned with the practical effect of having an LSC 
attorney withdraw in the middle of the case, Justice Scalia cursorily responded, "No 
litigant who, in the absence of LSC funding, would bring a suit challenging existing 
welfare law is dete??ed from doing so by [the LSC provision in controversy]." !d. at 554. 
And even if they were, Justice Scalia reasoned, "So what? The same result would ensue 
from excluding LSC-funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely." !d. at 556. It 
appears that Justice Scalia is arguing here that the greater right to completely not fund 
welfare litigation necessarily includes the lesser right to prohibit certain types of welfare 
litigation. Such reasoning, however, has been persuasively rejected in modern 
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence on a number of grounds . See Betman, supra 
note 17, at 18-19 (describing the various rejoinders to the greater-includes-the-lesser 
argument). 
107. See supra notes 93- 96 and accompanying text. 
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of Wa hington ??? the our! upheld a federal tax law ????????? that 
conditioned tax exempt tatu under ?Ol( c) 3) of the Jntemal Revenue 
ode109 on recipients not 1 articipating in lobbying or patti an political 
activitie .110 Thcn-Ju tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, made a 
distinction between whether an organization i permitted to lobby as a 
result of a law, as opposed to whether Congres i required to pro ide 
? ? organization with public money with which to I bby.?1?1 Wherea the 
former involve tbe doctrine of uncon titutional conditions Rehnqui t 
maintained ? ?? latter fall into a broad category f case that ?tand for 
the proposition that "a legi lature 's dcci ion not to subsidize the exerci e 
of a fundamental right doe not infiingc the right."?1?2 As Rehnqui t later 
expl a ined in hi di sent in League of Women Voters, [W]hen th 
Government i imply exerci ing it power to aJlocate it own public 
fund [the Court] need only find that the condition imposed has a 
rational relation hip to Congres ?? purpose in providing the ub i ly and 
that it is not primarily aimed at th uppre ion of dangerou idea ??????
Finding such a rational relation hip and the lack of an intention to uppres 
dangerou idea the majority in Regan upheld the ? ?
di pute. 11 4 
Subsidy ca e after Regan have failed to hed much ????? on how this 
important di tinction between a p natty and a subsidy can be made in an 
objective, con i tenl manner. For instance in lhe abortion-funding ca ?
of Rust v. Sullivan 115 recipients of Title X family plannjng fund. 116 were 
108. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
109. 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c)(3) (Supp. V 1982). 
llO. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 551. 
Ill. /d. 
112. }d. at 549· see also Cammarano v. Uni ted tates 35 U .. 49 515 (1959) 
(uphold ing a Treasury regu1ati n that denied bu ' iness cxpcn e deduction for 1 bbying 
activiti and rejecting the "notion that First Amendment right arc omeh w n t fully 
realized unless they are subsidized by the Sta?e"). For a recent example of thi ubsidy 
principle, see genera lly Locke v. Davey, 540 U . . 7 12 (-004). in which the ourt refuses 
?? force a tate to subsidize an individual . right of free cxerci e of religion in the higher 
education context . 
113. F v. League of Women Voter, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Relmquist, J., 
di enting) (quoting Cammarano, 5 U . . at 513). 
114. Regan 46 1 U. . at 550- 51. 
11 5. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U .. 173 ( 1991. . Rust was, at the time, the late ?? in a 
long line of abortion-funding ? es that had been simi larly charac terized as subsidy cases 
by the Court. The c ca c pennincd variou rc triction on a woman' · abi lity to chao c 
to Icnninatc her pregnancy. See Web. ter v. Rcprod . Health ervs. 492 U . . 490, 509 
( 19 9) (finding con titutional a ???????? ban on use of public employees and facilitie 
for performance or as istance of nonthe??p???ic aborti ns); ?????s v. McRae 44 U .. 
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prohibited by new Health and Human Services regulations fi:om engaging in 
abortion coun eting, referral and activities advocating abmtion as a method 
of ? ? ? ? ? ? planning.117 hief Ju tice Rehnquist, analogizing Rust to 
Regan 1 8 a s rted that what was at stake was only the subsidization 
of fundamental right - fTee peech rights and substantive due process 
tights-and not the denial of these same fundamental rights. 119 In this 
regard, he maintained that "Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling 
and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if 
the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at 
all."12? Consequently, he applied rational review and found that the 
government's subsidization practices in this area were rationally related 
to a legitimate governmental interest and not related to the suppression 
of a dangerous idea, namely, the promotion of the welfare of the mother 
and the unborn child. 121 
In a later unconstitutional conditions case, the subsidy group of 
Justices could only muster a plurality. In United States v. American 
297 315- 17 ( 1980) (upholding governm ntal regulations withholding public funds for 
nontheropcutic abortion but allowing payments ??? medical services related to childbirth); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 478- 0 (1977) (same). 
116. See 42 U. . . §§ 300-?OOa-6 (2006). Section I 00 of the Public Health 
ervice Act prohibits ??????? recipients from u ing tho e funds ??????????? i a potential 
fam?ly planning altemativc. See id. § 300a-6. 
117. See Rust 500 U . . at 178, I 0. 
118. See id. at 194, 197- 9 . 
119. !d. at 193 ("[T]he Government ba not di riminated on the basis of viewpoint; 
it has merely chosen ?o fund one ac tivity t the exclusion of ?? other. ')· ·ee also id. at 
192- 93 ("[G]ovemment may make a ?alue judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and . .. implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.'" (quoting Maher 
432 U .. at 474)); id. at 196 ("[Ti?le X ???????????? simply in ist[ed] thai public funds be 
pent for the ??????? for which they were authorized."). 
120. ld. at 202. 
121. ee id. at l93 . Justice Blackrnun, on the other band, wrote in hi di ent ????
the law in question based the granting of governmental larges e on U1c condition that 
doctor?and other fam ily planning funding recipient give up their right to free speech 
under the Fir L Amendment. See ;d. at 207 (Bia.ckmun, J., di enting) ("Whatever may 
be the Government ' s power to condition the receipt of its larges upon th 
?????????????? of con titutionaJ rights, il surely doc not extend to a condition that 
??????? es the recipient's cherished freedom of speech ba ed solely upon the content or 
viewpoint of ???? speech."). Moreover he argued that ????????? that federal fund are 
nol spent ??? a purpose outside the c pc of ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . falls far hort of that 
ncce sary to justify !he ??????????? of truth??? infonnation and professional medical 
opinion regarding consti tutionally protected conduct.' Id at 2 14. He also noted that the 
regulation detrimentally impacted the fifth Amendment rights of pregnant women ro 
choose whether ? ? not to have a child . See id. at 216 (''By suppres iug medically 
pertinent information and injecting a re trictive ideological message unrelated to 
considerations of maternal health the Government places formidable obstacle in the 
path of Title X clients' freedom of ?????? and thereby violate their ????? Amendment 
rights."). 
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Library Ass 'n, 122 the dispute involved whether the Children Internet 
Protection Act (CIPA) 123 provision that provided a federal subsidy for 
publi libraries t in tall littering software on their web-accessible 
computet wa an unconstitutional condition. 124 Here, the plurality found 
the provision to be a mere ub idy, finding that "the use of filtering software 
help to carry out these program , [and therefore] it is permissible under 
Ru ? ? ' 125 Both di ents found the Cl.PA provision in question to impose 
an uncon titulional co11dition witb Justice Stevens writing that the 
pro i ion ' impermi sibly conditions the receipt of Government funding 
on the rcst:ri tion of ignificant irst Amendment right . 126 
More recently? the ourt decided the Fir t Amendment ca e of 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acaderni and In ??????????Right?, Inc. (FAIR) .121 
FAIR concerned the enactment of the olom n Amendment by ongres , 
which prevent colleg s and universities from receiving ce1tain federal 
?unding?12? if they prohibit military recruiters "f?om gaining access to 
campuse , r acce to student . . . on campuses, for purposes of 
military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope 
122. Uni ted tate v. Am. Libra1y ??n, 53 U .. 194 (2003). hi f Ju lice 
Rehnqui ? ?? te ??he pl umlity decision in thi ub ?idy case and wa joined by ub idy 
Ju ? ? ? ? ? ' onnor, Scalia. and ??????? /d. 
12 . 'hildrcn's lnrcmet Protection Ael, Pub. L. o. 106-554. 114 tat. 276 A-335 
(2000). onecrning .????Professor De ?? ha observed: 
Rather than impo ing a broud prohibition on the material that ngr?s 
?on? idcrcd inappropriate, ?PA requires public libraries and publi cho ??? a 
a condition or receiving ??????? ??????? benefit , to use ' lecbnological protection 
measure ' (for ex. mple, filtering oftware) to ??????? library ?????? and 
?ublic schoc>l tudent from accessing objectionable exuall y c. pliclt material 
over the lntcmct. 
Anuj C. Desai, Filter? and Federalism: Public Library Internet Access, Local Control, 
and the Federal ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Power, 7 U. PA. J. Co ST. L. 1, 3 (2004). 
124. Am. ???????Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 210- 13. 
125. ld. at212. 
126. /d. at 225 Steven J., di senting); see al?? id. ai 23 1 (Souter, J., dissenting 
??????? blocking requirements ?????IPA) ... impose an uncon ti?utional eondi1ion on the 
Government' subsidies to ????? ???????? for providing access to ? ? ? Internet.??. The 
dis. ent rs believed thRt the fi ltering ???? arc would inevitably block protected First 
Amendment speech either th rough underblock ing or overblocking of web sites. /d. at 
22 1- 22 ( tevcns J. dis nting); see id at 233- 4 ( outer, J ? ? dis ?enting). 
127. Rum fcld v. Forum for endemic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FA IR), 547 
u .. 47 (2006). 
12 . /d. at 51. A ??though tud ?? financial assistance i · not co red by th law, 
federal funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland ccurity Tr:msportation, 
Labor, llea lth and Human ervice and Education, among other agencic may be lost at 
tJ1e uuiver ity-widc level if sch ??do not c mply with the Solomon Amendment. ee 
10 ... § 983(d (2006) . 
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to the acce to campuses and to student that is provided to any other 
employer."129 A number of law chool believed that the olomon 
Amendment required them to choose between abandoning their policie 
again t exual rientation di crimination or lo ing a ??bstantial amount 
of federa l funding. 130 This tb y argu d infringed on their i.rst 
?????? nt right of peecb and as ociation. 131 
Although ??? Third Circuit Court f Appeal truck down the Solomon 
mendm?nt, holding, inter alia that it ignificantly interfered with the 
First Amendment expressive as ociation right of the law school in 
question and therefore imposed an uncon. titutional condiLion 112 the 
Supreme Court reversed. 13 The ourt avoided the uncon titutional 
condition que tion altogeth r by deciding that the expressiv rights of 
th law school were minimally burdened by the pre ence of military 
recruiter on campus. 134 The ourt concluded ???? a ???????condjtion is 
not unconstitutional if il can be con titutionally impo ed directly135 and 
determined that imposing the access requirement would not violate the 
law schools' First Amendment rights to free speech or association. 136 It 
may be that because the ???????group of Justices is no longer able to 
agree on a basis on which to label unconstitutional conditions cases as 
subsidy or penalty cases, they are simply choosing to avoid the issue 
altogether whenever possible. 
C. The Penalty-Subsidy Schools at Loggerheads 
All in all, when the government act in it sovereign capacity, 
applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions remains fraught with 
uncertainties? and it appea1 that there is no end in sight to tb ??? ? nt 
doctrinal stalemate. Even though the two ide in thi jurisprudential 
struggle agree that government may unequaUy ub idize the exerci e of 
a constitutional right and may not condition a benefit on the denial of a 
constitutional right 137 that appears to be where the agreement end . ln 
129. 10 u.s.c. § 983(b) (2006). 
130. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 53. 
131. Jd. 
132. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 
219,243 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47. 
133. FAIR, 547 U.S . at 70. 
134. !d. at 69-70. 
135. !d. at 59- 60 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S . 513, 526 (1958)). 
136. Jd. at 70. 
137. See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 79 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (' [T]he law normally give legislatures broad authority to decide how to 
spend the People ' money. A legislature, after all, generally has the right not to fund 
activities that it wo?ld prefe.r not to f1md-even where the activities arc otherwise 
protected.'' (citing Regan . Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 ( 1983)))· 
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deciding what a penally ase is and what a subsidy case is, the 
disagreement eems to revolve around whether government ubsidization of 
certain "alte??ative activity deemed in tb public intere t"13 is tantamount 
to "coercive interference" by the go ernment with an individual 's 
constitutional rights. 139 Or perhaps put more simply, there is a c rtain lin 
beyond which government ub idy of an alternative activity becomes 
nothing ??s than the govemment' acting in an intimidating manner to 
interfere with th con titutiona l rights of its citizens. 
The abortion-funding ca e are typical of how the line drawing works 
in these cases.14° For example, the majority ub idy Justices- labeled 
the state and federal laws mere ub idjza tion because they did not 
believe the subsidization of an alternative activity- in those cases, the 
promotion f child birlh over abortion-significantly impinged on the 
right of pregnant women t choo e to ????? their pregnancies. 141 This 
tance appear to derive from th belief that differential subsidization is 
permis ible a long a a formal opportunity to exercise constitutional 
rights exi ts out ide the program in another forum. 142 Such a neoformalistic 
approach thu first b came apparent dealing with unconstitutional conditions 
in government-as-sovereign cases. 
see also Lyng v. Auto. Worker , 485 U . . 360, 36 ( 198 ) (holding that the federal 
govemmcnt s refusal to provide fo d stamp benefits to strik ing worker was ju tificd 
becau c 'strikers' right of ??sociation does not require the Government to fumi h funds 
to maximize the exer ise of that ?ight"). 
13 . ee Harri v. McRae,44 U .. 297.3 15( 1980). 
139. ee id at 327- 2 (White, J. concurring)· ·ee also ullivan supra note 83, at 
143 (noting that coercion has been invoked ? ? a justification ?or .. trik[i ng] down 
condition that affect right lo freedom of pcech, religion and a ciation, but without a 
consi tent r satisfying the ry''). ? ? ? see id. at 1505 (maintain ing that labeling a ca c 
as an uncon tilutional conditions one ba ·ed n concerns of coercion i rea lly just a 
"conclu ory label ma qucrading a ana lysis"). 
140. 'ee, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. '. 173 (19 ?); Webster v. Rcprod. Health 
ervs., 492 U.S. 490 (19 9); Harris. 44 U .. 297· Maher . Roc, 432 U .. 4 4 1977. 
141. See, e.g., Harris, 448 . . at 315- 16 ("??]t simply d cs n ? follow that a 
woman's freedom of choice ca??ie? with it a con titulional ent it lement to the .financial 
re ?ourc?s t avail herself of the full range of protected choice ."). 
142. ee Ru?1, 500 . . at 19 ("By requiring that the Title X gran tee engage in 
abortion-related activi ty separately fr m activity rccci ing fed ??? funding. ongre s 
ha . con i tent wi th our teachings in League ?f Women Voters and Regan, not denied it 
the right to engage in abortion-related acti itics. ongrc.ss has merely rcfu ed to fund 
such aclivi tic ut of the public ???c, an ? the cretary bas imply required a certain 
degree of eparation from the Title X project in order to en ure the integrity of the 
federal ly fund d program."). 
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Conversely, the dissenting penalty Justices in these same cases believe 
just as strongly that such subsidization significantly coerces doctors in 
their free speech rights when counseling pregnant women and also 
coerces these same women in their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to tenn. 143 As an example, 
Justice Blackmun in the Rust case found the majority's conclusion 
"insensitive and contrary to common human experience, [as b ]oth the 
purpose and result of the challenged regulations are to deny women the 
ability voluntarily to decide their procreative destiny."144 This point of 
view derives from these penalty Justices' firmly held belief that a fonnal 
analysis under these circumstances is insufficient and that social justice 
instead requires a more practical analysis of the impact of such cases. 145 
Such an approach requires nothing less than considering how the 
outcome of the case will actually affect the parties. 146 
In short, it might be said without exaggeration that the quagmire in 
which the Court finds itself in these unconstitutional conditions cases 
where government acts in its sovereign capacity is as fundamental as the 
distinction between legal formalism and legal realism. 147 Yet, as discussed 
143. See, e.g., id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("By suppressing medically pertinent 
infmmation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of 
maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X 
clients' freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment rights."). 
144. !d. at 217. Justice Blackmun would instead have applied a more searching 
???? of scrutiny and, at the very least, balanced the govenunent's interests in promoting 
a certain type of family platming against the First Amendment rights of doctors and the 
Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights of pregnant women. See id. at 213-14. 
145. In other words, the penalty Justices would argue that it is necess??y to 
practically consider the impact that the nonsubsidization will have on individuals whose 
constitutional rights may be impacted. This line of reasoning resonates with the ???????
political debate between President Obama and his detractors over the need for a Supreme 
Court Justice to have empathy and to understand the real world implications of his or her 
decisions. See, e.g. , Janet Hook & Christi Parsons, Obama Says Empathy Key to Court 
Pick, L.A. TIMEs, May 2, 2009, at AI ("President Obama, who will choose the nominee, 
focused not on volatile ideological questions but on personal character, saying he wanted 
someone with 'empathy' for 'people's hopes and struggles."'). 
146. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROW?NG THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 144 (2002) ("For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it 
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases with an agenda, the facts are of minor 
importance and the persons affected are wmtby of ahnost no attention. . . . The people 
and their problems that have been grist for the constitutional mill are incidental."); see 
also Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1497-98 (arguing for a "systemic" approach to 
unconstitutional conditions, which, among other things, "recognizes that background 
inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one's bargaining position in 
relation to government, and that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties"). 
Justice Rehnquist clearly does not agree with Sullivan's and her legal realist compatriots' 
approach because in deciding Rust-for which Sullivan was on brief for petitioners- he 
sided with respondents and characterized the case, yet again, as a subsidy case. 
147. Although legal fonnalism and legal realism are capable of many different 
meanings, Judge Posner offers some helpful insights in this regard. He defines legal 
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above, tbe practical or Tealist approach adopted by the penalty Ju tice i 
more of a respon e to an emerging neof? rmali m in which the ub idy 
group pays in ufficient attention t the real world consequence of it 
decisions. And a the id s continue to talk pa t one another the gap in 
under tanding how to con i tently apply the doctrine f uncon titutional 
onditions in the government-a - ov reign context persi t .?4 
But this neoformaJist-pragmati t divide in unconstitutional condition 
ca es i not limited to the government-as- overeign context. ince the 
Co urt deci ion in Pickering the ame divide ha animated tbe 
unconstitutiona.l condition analysi in the public employment context. 
A demon trated in Part V the subsidy Justice have al o emerged 
vi torious in their judicial battle with the penalty Ju tice in a ?? in 
which government a t in its employer capacity. But in thi area, the u e 
of the government speech doctrine ha done a substantial amount of the 
heavy analytical lifting fo r the ub icly Ju tice . 
V. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT 
ACTS AS AN EMPLOYER 
In ome way th development of the do trine of un on titutional 
condition in employment has para lleled its development in the ub idy 
context. For example ju t a the United tate upreme ourt n e held 
that govemment benefits were m r privil.ege that could be withheld or 
limi ted on any condition 149 Ju tice Oliver W ndell Holme on c famou Jy 
said that in the employment context a per on "may have a con titutional 
formalism a ??????????? a commentator to pronow1cc the outcome of the case a. being 
correct or incorrect. in approximately the am way that ??? olution to o mathematical 
problem can be pron unced ??correct incon'Ccl. Ricbard A. P snor, Legal Formalism, 
Legal Realism, and the lnte11Jretation of Statutes and the ????????????? 37 CA ??W. ? ? ? ?
L. REv. 179, ? ?(19 6). Legal rcaJism, in contrast is de(jned as "deciding a ca ?? o that 
its outcome best promotes ?ublic welfare in nonlegalistic terms? it is policy analysis.' 
!d. lntcrc tingly, Judge Posner ? ? ? ? not believe fonnali. m or realism hould be utilized 
when interpreting statut or constitutional provision but only in developing ? ? ?
common law. See id. 
14 . See generally Barbara A. anch z ? ote, United tatcs . Ameri an Library 
Association: The Choice ??????? Cash and ????????????? Rights, 3? AKRON . REV. 
463, 492- 93 (2005) discu ing th continuing chasm of view on th proper application 
of the ? ? on titutional conditions doctrine in American Library Association). 
149. ee, e.g., People v. ran?, 108 .E. 427 429- 30 (N.Y. 1915), ojJ'd, 239 U .. 
19 ( 1 ??? (limiting public employment ?? citizens on the theory that "[w]hatever is a 
privilege ??????than a right may be made dependent on citi zenship"). 
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right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."1 50 
But just as Supreme Comi precedent has sought to establish the end of 
the right-privilege distinction when the government acts in the sovereign 
capacity, 151 the Court, at least initially, arrived at this same conclusion in 
the government-as-employer context as wel1. 152 For instance, in the 
landmark public employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the 
Supreme Comi stated emphatically: "[T]he ?????? that public employment 
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected."153 
Thus, as in the sovereignty context, the government "may not deny a 
benefit to a person on a basis that ????????? his constitutionally protected 
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." 154 The same 
reasoning that applied to the govemment-as-sovereign cases also applies 
here: "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of 
his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of 
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited"155 and "produce 
a result which [it] could not command directly."156 Yet, important 
distinctions do remain when the government acts as an employer as 
150. See McAuliffe v. Mayor ofNew Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see 
also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (finding "no constitutional 
infi??ity" to a law that required public employees to declare past and present Communist 
affiliation). 
151. See Suga?man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) ("[T]his Court now has 
rejected the concept that constitutional rights tum upon whether a govemmental benefit 
is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."' (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365,374 (1971))). 
152. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ("[C]onstitutional 
doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise. That premise 
was that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon 
the su??ender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govemment 
action."). 
153. See id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 
(2d Cir. 1965)) (intemal quotation marks omitted); see also ????? v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-centuty, this Court has made clear that even 
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable govemmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons 
upon which govemment may not rely.')· herbert v. Verner, 374 U.S . 398, 404 (1963) 
(stating that in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context, 
"[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be 
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege") . 
154. See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. 
155. !d. 
156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall , 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 
(1972) ("[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of 
governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First 
Amendment rights."); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 806 ('The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions rejects the notion that the govemment's power to grant a benefit includes the 
lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit."). 
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opposed to when it acts in its sovereign capacity. As already discussed, 
Justice Marshall emphatically stated in Pickering that "it cannot be 
gain aid that the State ha interests as an employer in regulating the 
peech of it empl.oyee that differ ?ignif?cantly from those it possesses 
in connection with regulation of the ·peech of the citizenry in general."157 
Although Ju tice Marsha ll in Pickering did not cite to any precedent to 
upport hi a sertion about the uniquene of the government in its 
empl.oyer capacity, the upreme ourt on numerous occasions since has 
affirmed lh i view of the varying degrees of power that government bas 
depending upon which hat it is wearing. 158 ?or example in her opinion 
for the Court in Board of County Commis ioners v. Umbehr 159 Ju tice 
O'Connor explained that a governm nt employee s clo e relation hip 
with the government requiJe a balancing of important fre ?peech and 
government interest . 160 In such relation ?hip? , "[t]?c government needs 
to be free to term inate both employees and contractors fo r poor 
perfonnance, to improve the efficiency efficacy and re ponsiveness of 
service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of ???????? n."161 In 
157. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 568 (1968 (empha ·i added)· see 
supra notes 6 - 67 and accompanying text. 
15 . ee Wate1 v. hurchill 511 ???661 671 - 72 (1994} (plurality opinion) ("We 
have never explicitly answered thi question (about the gove???ent's dual roles], though 
we have alway a umed that its premise is orrect- lhat the g vernmcnt as employer 
indeed ha far broader power than do ??the govcmment ? ? over?ign." (citing Pickering 
391 U.S. at 568 ? Bd. of due. v. Grumet, 5 12 U 6 7 71 (1994) ( ' onnor, J., 
concurring) 'We have ... no one Free peech ?au ?? test. We have different test for 
c ntent-ba cd speech re trictions, for content-neutral speech re triction for rcs1rictions 
imposed by the government acting as employer, for re trictions in nonpublic fora, and 
on.")· onnick v. Myers 461 U .. 138, 147 (19 3); U.S. ivil crv. omm'n v. ? at'l 
Ass'n of Letter arri?rs, 413 U.S. 548, 5 4 (1973)· see al o Eugene Volokh, A ??????-
Law Model for Religiou ????? ? ? ?? ? ? 46 LA L. R ? . 1465 1497 ( 1999) 
("Admini trative efficiency is genera lly not considered a ompelling interest under strict 
crutiny, which may be one reason ???? free speech ca es have ext licitly ad ptcd ? more 
deferential tandard for government-as-employer regulations instead of purporting to 
apply trict crutiny." (citation omitted . 
159. Bd. of nty. omm'r . Umbchr, ? U.S. 668 1996). 
160. ld. at6 0. 
161. ld. at 674; . ee also Wa?ers, 51 ? . . at 674-75 ("[T]he extra power the 
government has in this area comes from the nature of the govcmment' mission as 
employer. overnment agencies are charged by Jaw with doing ?????????? ta k . 
Agencie hire employees to help d tho e task ? ?effectively and efficiently as pos ??????
When ??????who is paid a salary o that he will contribute to the agency' effective 
operation begin to do or ay things that detract from the agency's effective operation, 
the govemment empl yer rnu ? have omc power t rc train her.')· see also Mark 
Tu hnet, The Possibilities of?Compara?ive Constitu??????????, ?0 Y AL L.J. 1225 1250 
(1999) ("Th government has in trumental or programmatic goal within the domain of 
937 
a similar vein, Justice Powell explained in his concu??ing ??????? in 
Arnett v. Kennedy that "the Govemment's interest ... is the maintenance 
of employee efficiency and discipline .... To this end, the Govemment, 
as an employer mu t have wide discretion and control over the 
management of it per onoel and intemal affairs." 162 Lastly, in her 
plurality decision in Waters v. Churchill Justice 0 onnor juxtaposed 
the two roles that government plays by desc ribing certain First 
Amendment doctrines that cou.ld not be reasonably applied to speech of 
govemrneot employees 163 and by outlining the le s stringent proced??al 
. fi . . J , h !64 reqlllrements ?or restnchon on government emp oyees speec . 
But although it is generally agreed that the government has more 
power to interfere with con titutional rights in its employment 
capacity, 165 it is far from clear how to assess which employment practices 
are permissible and which are not. 166 In any event, the Court on numerous 
occasions ince Pickering ba reaffim1ed this view of the government's 
greater latitude when conditioning public employee rights in the 
workplace. 167 
??????????? When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of it 
programmatic goals." footnote omitted) (citing . Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and 
Free Speech, 33 HARV. .R.- .L. L. REv. 1 L6-21 (1998))). lndeed, ab.ent contr?ctual, 
tatut??y, or con litutional restriction, the government is entitled to terminate employe 
and contractor ? ? an at-will ba i , for good rca on bad reason, or no reason at all. See 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. a ? 674. 
162. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Lf it 
were otherwise, Ju tice PowelJ explain , the government employer would not be able to 
remove inefficient and ??????????????workers quickly, and the goverrunent's ub tamial 
interest in so doing would be fru trated without adequate justification. /d. 
16 . See Water , 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of ?irst 
Amendment doctriJle , such as obscenity, that do not app ly with the ame force in the 
government-as-employer context, and stating that the employer ' may bar its employee 
from using Mr. Cohen' offensive utterance to members of the publi or to the people 
with whom ihey work" (citing Coltcn v. California 403 U . . 15, 2 25 (1971))). 
164. See id. at 673 (observing that although speech ??? trictions on private citizens 
must precisely defi11e the speecJJ they target a government employer i permitted to 
prohibit it employees from acting "rude to customers' even though this re triclion 
would be void for agueness under traditional First Amendment juri prudence). 
165. 'ee id. (observing U1at the Court has "consistently given greater deference to 
government prediction of harn1 used to justify ??????????? of employee pcccb than to 
predictions ofhann used to ju tify re trictions on the speech of the pllblic ?????????). 
166. See Conn?ck v. Myers, 461 U.S. 13 ? 150 (1983) (noting the difficulty 
associated with the Pickering balancing)? Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and injunctions in ????????????Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 204 ( 1998) 
('The Court bas acknowledged that sucb ?????????????? balancing is difficult, and this 
seems to be ? ? understatement. From all we've seen of the lower court decision , th 
???? i essentially indetetminate in all but th easiest cases." (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150)). 
167. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U . . at 671- 72 (plurality opinion) ("We have never 
explicitly answered this question '[about the government ' dual roles], tbough we have 
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A. The Dwindling First Amendment Speech Rights of 
Public Employees Past-Pickering 
Although Pickering came out in favor of Marvin Pickering, the 
development of the doctrine since then has been generally one of limiting 
the scope of the balancing test set forth therein. Initially, the Court 
continued to protect public employee rights through the Pickering 
constitutional balance. For instance, public employee free peech ca es 
po t-Pickering have established that the Fir t mendment protects 
government worker from being terminated for privately criticizing their 
employer polici 168 for publicly expressing dislike for prominent 
political figures 169 and even wb n those workers are independent contractors 
for the go ernment employer. 170 
Yet not too long after public employee free speech protection reached 
its apex in Pickering, a new group of Justices began to whittle away 
these protection . Fir ? ? th Court in Mount Healthy Board of Education v. 
Doyle made it easier for employer to defend against these First 
Amendment claim . 171 Under the Mount Healthy framework even if a 
public employee can show that an employer's adve1 e employment action 
was motivated by the employee's prate ted speech Ju tice Rehnquist 
developed the "same deci ion" test to protect public employers from 
liabi lity in a ubcategory of ca e . Under the same decision te t if the 
employer can prove that it would have made the same decision regarding 
the employee in the absence or the protected peech, it may e cape 
liability. 172 Ju ·tice Rehnquist wrote in this regard: ' The con titutiona1 
principle at take is ufficiently indicated if uch an employee is placed 
in no wor capo ition than if he had not engaged in the conduct.' 173 
Next, the Comi decided the "public concern' test of Connick v. 
Myers. 174 Recall that in Pickering, Justice Marshall set up the balancing 
test this way: 
alway assumed that its premise i correct-that lhe governmem s employer indeed ha 
??? broader powers that docs the government a sovereign."). 
16 . ee, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line onsol. ch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 414-16 (1979). 
169. ee, e.g. Rankin v. McPh rson 48 U .. 378, 86 (19 7). 
170. ee, e.g., Bd. of nty. Comm rs v. Umbehr, 51 U . . 66 , 673 (1996). 
171 . ML Healthy ity ch. Dist. Bd. of ?????v. ??yle, 429 U. . 274, 286 ( 1977). 
172. Jd. at 285- 86. 
173. Jd. 
174. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
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The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the inter st of the 
[public employee), as a itizen in commenting upon ???????of public concem 
and the inl'ere. t of ihe ????? as an employer, in ????????? the efficiency of the 
public services it perfot1ll through it. ?mployees.?l75 
Justice White, the partial di enter in Pickering and now writing for the 
majority in Connick, utilized th ????icized language above from 
Pickering to require that the public employee first show that he or she 
spoke on a matter of public concem before getting the benefit of the 
Pickering balance. 176 The ?????adopted this new requirement ba ed on 
the common- en e realization that government offices could not fun ????? if 
eve?y employment deci ion became a constitutional matter. 117 Gojng 
forward , public mployee speech characterized as being a matter of 
???????? interest," Like a per onnel dispute would no longer receive the 
protection of lhe First Amendment. 178 
The coup de grace ?????? t Pickering however, wa recently delivered 
by the Roberts Cowt in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 179 In Garcetti, a deputy 
di trict attomey for Los Angeles County Richard Ceballo , wa ubje ted 
to advcr e employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly 
defective earch warrant in a ciiminal case. 180 Although th Garcetti 
Colll't paid l·ip ?????? to its commitment to the doctrine of unconstitutional 
condition in public employment,t81 Ju tice Kennedy for the 5----4 majority 
nonetheless held that if employees are engaged in peech pursuanl to 
their official duties at work, they are not p aking a 'citizen ' and thus 
enjoy no Fir t Amendment protection for their peech. 182 Because 
Ceballos wa engaged in speech pursuant to his job duties, he was not 
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concem but only a a 
government employee. A uch the ourt concluded that eballo did 
175. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968) (emphasis added). 
176. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41 , 143. 
177. Jd. at 143. 
178. To be fair though, the hl1Id1e imposed by Connick bccom much m re 
manageable in a mall subset of cases in which the public employee speech i found to 
be completely unrelated to his or her public employment and i poken on the employee's 
own time in a nonworking setting. See United States v. at I Treasury ?????Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 465-66, 475 (1995). 
179. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
180. /d. at 413- 15. 
181. See id. at 417 ("The Court has made clear that public employees do not 
urrender ? ? ? their First Amendment right by rea on of their employment. Rather the 
First Amendment protect ' a pllblic employee's right, in certain cir umstance , to speak 
?? a citizen addre sing matters of public concern."). 
182. ld. at 424. lntereslingly, thi holdjng that government worke1 cannot act a 
employees and citizen ai the ame time cont.rovens a previous statement of the ourt 
that a teacher making a presentation before a board of education ? poke both as an 
employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights." ity of Madi on ?????????
Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. ?mp't Relations Comm n 429 U . . 167 176 n. J ? ( 1976). 
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not have any First Amendment protection, and there was no need to 
consider under Connick whether he spoke on a matter of public concern 
or to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests. 183 
Garcetti drastically cuts down on public employees' First Amendment 
p ech rights. 184 ln the name of managerial prerogative, 185 federalism, 
and eparation of powers 186 Garcetti has the effect of making government 
les tran parent accountable and responsive. This is because public 
emp loyees are now le ecure in their ability to speak out against 
govemmental fraud abu e and waste without facing retribution from 
their public employer .1 7 The Gar etti majority, rather than focusing on 
the imp rtance of public employ es' ability to help ensure the 
maintenance of an ac ountable and transparent government as the 
Pickering Court did, focused instead on more sinister concerns about 
employees' impairing the proper performance of efficient governmental 
functions. The decision also inappropriately focu e on the forn1al 
opportunity to still exercise constitutional rights, even though employee 
cannot now exercise those rights while working and performing their 
assigned duties. In all, then, Garcetti redefines the role public employees 
should play in ensuring the fair and efficient administration of government 
services. 188 
183. See Garcefti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
184. David L. Hudson Jr., Garcettized' '06 Ruling Still Zapping Speech, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR. (Jan. 15, 2010), bttp://www.firstamendmentcenter.orgicommentary. 
aspx?id=22501 ("[Garcetti] has led to the dismissal of legions of public-employee 
lawsuits. lt bas threatened legitimate wbistleblowers wanting to speak out on impo11ant 
matters of public con e??."). 
185. See Lawrence Ro cnthal, The Emerging Fir t Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 2008) ('The ourt opinion [in Garce??? 
contains a sketch- concededly partial and omewhat ob cure-of managerial control 
over employee speech as essential if management is to ? ? held politically accountable for 
the performance of public institutions."). 
186. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U .. 587, 617 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J. c ncurring) ?"The ourt ?? refused to establish a constitutional ???? that 
would require or allow 'permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental 
pcrations to a degree incon i ?????with sound principles of federali m and the ????ration 
of power . "(quoting Garce??i. 547 U . . at423)). 
? 7. See Wat?? v. hurchill, S ?? U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
("Government employ e arc often in the best position to know what ails the agencies 
for which they w ?k."). 
? 8. ee Helen orton Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's 
ontrol of ? ? ?Workers' Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009). 
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B. Garcetti as a Subsidy Public Employment Case 
Prior examination of Garcetti, however, does not sufficiently explain 
how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been undermined in 
the public employment free speech context. Thi i not your great-
grandfather legal formaJj m. To understand more fully how the sub idy 
school of thought ha begun to hold way in case in which government 
acts in its employment capacity it i neces ary to cons ider the Garcetti 
majority's invocation of a line of argument ?????????? to the Pickering 
doctrine. 1 9 
Thi line of argument involves a particular brand of sub idy argument. 
rn coming to it cooclu. ion in Garcetti the majority commented that 
????? 's peech 'owe[d] its existence to ????? professional respon ibilities 
and "simply reflect the exercise or employer control over what the 
employer itself ha commis ioned or created." 190 Justice outer pondered 
aloud in his dissent ' [W]hy d tl1e majority' concern which we all 
hare, require categorical exclu ion or First Amendment protection 
against any official retaliation for lhings said on the job? ' 191 Tbe an wer 
appears to b : Because the ubsidy approach require it. 
Recall Lbe abortion-funding ·ubsidy case of .Rust v. Sullivan,192 in 
????? the ourt held there wa no infringement of the speech rights of 
Title X funds recipient and their taff: when the Govemment forbade 
any on-the-job counseling in fa or of abortion a a method of family 
planning.' 193 A corollary to this sub idy argument later developed by 
lhe Court i that 'when the govemment appropriates public funds to 
pr mote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say wbal it 
wishe ?? 194 
ln Garcetti rather than ub idizing a public health program and 
" imply insisting that public fund be spent [by doctors] for the purpo es 
for which they were authorized 195 the Court i in es ????? saying that 
public employment itself is "subsidized ? by the government and thus the 
govemment is entitled to say what it wishes through it government 
employee without worrying about the e ame emp loyee Fir t 
Amendment free speech right . Thus when an employee peaks out of 
tum like Assistant District Attorney Ceballos in the Garcetti case-or 
189. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 421- 22 (majority opinion). 
19 I. I d. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
I92. Rustv.Sullivan,500U.S.173, I77-78(1991). 
193. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-
200). 
194. /d. (quoting .Ro enberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 5 I 5 U.S. 819, 
833 (1995)) (inte??al quotation marks omitted). 
195. Rust, 500 U ???at L96. 
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p rhaps this rea oning ven applies to Mr. Pickering him elf- the 
employee is no longer engaged in government speech. He or he i al o 
without Fir t Amendment protection according the Court becaus tb 
g vemment employer need not sub idize pe ch of which it doe not 
approve. 196 
The C urt thu doc nothing le s than turn the uncon litutional 
conditions doctrine n it head by aying that the government employer 
i not onditioning public employment on public employees' forfeiting 
th ir 1ight to speech but instead i merely requiring that it sub idized 
peech- in the mouth of its employee- be u ed to promote the 
particular p licies for which the employee was hired. 
Now a Ju tice uter poin out in his Garcetti di ent the c mparison 
between the ub idization f peech in Rust and Garcetti is totally 
inapt. 197 Wherea ?????? are only allowed to take Title X fu nd if they 
agree not to promote abortion, most public employees do not take their 
jobs on the condition that they say only what the go emment wants them 
to ay. 19 Thj is not to ay tbat uch policymaking public employees do 
not exi t but employee like Pickering, Myer and eballo are hired to 
p rform a discretionary function not to ??????the government. t99 
??? by treating all public employee as merely promoting govemment 
speech the Garcetti court d e nothing less than tran form government 
mployment back into a privil ge. Justice Ho lme ' ob ervation i one 
again apposite: [A public employee] may have a con titutional right to 
talk politic but he has no con titutional right to be a policeman."200 
imilarly, under Garcetti conception public schoo l teacher di trict 
attorney , or p lice officer may have the right to talk politi on their 
own time but tho e empl yees have no right to publi employment if 
196. Under the gove????nt pcech doctrine, individual can be compelled to parrot 
govemment speech with ut implicating any individual First Amendment right . ee 
Johanns v. Live tock Mktg. As ·'n 544 U.S. 550 559 (2005). 
197. ee G(lrcetti 547 U .. at 43 ( outer. J., di senting) ( '[T]hc c interest. on the 
govemmcnt's part are ntirely distin t from any claim that Ceballos pe?ch was 
government pecch wid1 a pre et or proscribed content as exemplified in Rusr.'') . 
19 . In thi regard. Ju tice utcr notes that"[ ]ome public employee arc hired to 
'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular me ?sage ??? by the 
government but not everyone working for the govcmmcnt after all , i hired to speak 
from a govemmcnt manifesto." ??? at 437 (citing Legal ervs. orp. v. Vcla7.qu z, 53l 
U .. 533, 542 (20 l)). 
199. Pickering wa certainly not hired ? ? parrot the Board line though the Board 
would have ertainly liked him not to be . uch a nuisance. 
200. McAllliffev. Mayorof cwBcdford,29 .·. 517, 517(Mas.l892). 
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they wish to engage in on-duty speech the government does not sanction. 
To do so, according to the majority in Garcetti, would be tantamount to 
requiring the government to subsidize employee speech that the government 
does n t approve. 
l.:n bort under the government speech doctrine, completely absent in 
Pickering the ubsidy school of jurisprudential thought has eviscerated 
th uncon titutional conditions doctrine in public employment. What is 
left is a neoformalism that permits the Court to say that as long as 
employees have a formal opportunity to exercise their constitutional 
rights as citizens outside of their on-job work responsibilities, nothing 
more is required to protect them from the penalty imposed by this 
unconstitutional condition. This neofonnalism is particularly problematic 
because of its insidious nature. Although much of the Garcetti decision 
is clearly ba ed on traditional categorical distinctions between citizen 
and employee: the majority ubsidy Justices also sneak in this observation 
about the connection between unco???????????? conditions and the 
government speech doctrine. The problem is that once lower federal 
courts begin to treat public employee speech as equivalent to government 
peech even le of a pos ibiJity ex ist that the peech will gamer any 
constitutional protection. So although public employee free peech 
right are ???? ntly in the process of fading away, an expansion of this 
government peech doctrine to encompas mo t government employees 
would be outright catastropJ1ic for the e employees' constitutional rights 
in the workplace. 
Consider the impact of this neoformalistic approach on just one 
subsequent case, though there are many examples in the four years since 
Garcetti.201 In Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, a police officer was 
fired for complaining about the incompetence of his superior in reducing 
training for the canine unit and for asserting his belief that these actions 
would adversely affect public safety.202 Before Garcetti, the police 
officer actually survived summary judgment at the district court level on 
his First Amendment retaliation claim because he was clearly speaking 
out on a matter of public concern.203 
After Garcetti, however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the officer's 
claim. Once the court classified the officer as a "public employee 
carrying out his professional responsibilities,"204 from that point forward 
he was robbed of citizen status and was considered a mere employee 
without constitutional protections. Remarkably, the court hinted that if 
201. See Hudson, supra note 184. 
202. Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 2007). 
203. ld. at 364. 
204. ld. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006)). 
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the police officer had taken his gripe outside the police department and 
written a letter to a newspaper editor criticizing the city's canine 
program-much in the way Pickering brought his complaints about his 
school to the public-he could have received First Amendment protection?05 
The perverse incentive thus established by Garcelli i for employee 
such as the officer in Haynes not to bring their con ern and complaint 
through internal dispute mechani m but rather to make any workplace 
disagreement into a pubJj affair. Altho·ugh one would think uch an 
outcome flies in the face of Pickering? concem f ensuring the efficiency 
of govermnental service, nevertheless the neofonnalist approach of 
Garcetti leads to this absurd result. 
Vl. EMBRACING THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF NEOFORMALISM 
The neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights in the public 
employment context has made the government less transparent and 
accountable because public employees are now less secure in speaking 
ab ut their public employm nt. It is therefore important to restore the 
vitality of the w1con titutional conditions doctrine through a restoration 
of Pickering it con tiLutional balancing standards, and the penalty 
v r ion of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine. Only when 
government action that practically trw1cate or impinge on the right of 
public employee are no longer tolerated will public employees again be 
able to be the vanguard of the citizenry, protecting all citizens against 
govermnent fraud, waste, and abuse. 
A. A Return to Pickering's First Principles 
Pickering itself is a penalty case. Consider that Pickering himself was 
not hired to pa??ot the government line of the employer. Indeed, he 
wrote specifically "as a citizen" when he wrote his letter to the Lockport 
Herald 206 
The Pickering Court recognized that there was a potential of 
govermnent abuse if Pickering were able to be fired merely because "the 
best interests" of the school required it. That line of argument, adopted 
by the Illinois Supreme Court majority in Pickering, would have held the 
constitutional rights of Pickering and others at the mercy of school 
205. ld. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422) . 
206. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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officials. The majority opinion in Pickering rejected the subsidy argument 
and adopted the penalty view that a substantial burden on a public 
employee's free speech rights would be considered unconstitutional 
unless narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. 
Not only is the approach taken by the subsidy Justices in subsequent 
public employee free speech cases not narrowly tailored in that its 
approach is being applied to employees who are not hired to parrot the 
government line,207 but the government interest being advanced is 
downright inimical to the idea of an open and transparent democratic 
society. Pickering spends much time discussing the importance of 
having teachers and other public employees who work for the 
government inf??m the rest of us about the events that transpire in the 
government workplace. These employees are ideally placed to sound the 
alarm when government is no longer acting in the best interest of its 
people. Through its holding in Garcetti, however, the Court has now 
made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out 
in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers. 
Under Pickering, it was not seen as inconsistent that the same person 
could be both an effective government employee and an outspoken 
citizen concemed for the greater society.208 Under this broader conception 
of public employment, there was no intemal tension within these citizen-
employees because when they spoke publicly to point out an injustice in 
government or to right a govemment wrong, not only were they making 
their own workplace better but they were making society better as well??09 
The Court itself developed this idea that public employees play a unique 
role in a representative democracy in Pickering and other cases.210 Given 
207. Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent suggests ample reason why the 
govemment speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering doctrine. 
????? ? ? ? ? 547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J. , dissenting). He notes that "[s]ome public 
employees are hired to 'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular 
message set by the government, but not everyone working for the govemment, after all, 
is hired to speak from a government manifesto." ld. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)) . 
208. Accord id. at 432 ("[T]he very idea of categorically separating the citizen's 
interest from the employee's interest ignores the fact that the ranks of public service 
include those who share the poet's 'object ... to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation."' 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Robe1t Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in 
COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251 , 252 (R. Poirer & M. Richardson eds., 1995))). 
209. !d. ("[T]hese citizen servants are tl1e ones whose civic interest rises highest 
when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones govemment 
employers most want to attract."). 
210. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S . 563 (1968) ("Teachers are, as a class, 
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to 
how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is 
essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal."); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per 
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the sheer size of American government, it is impossible for ordinary 
citizens to keep tabs on everything their government is doing at any 
given time. Government employees therefore must be the vanguard of 
the citizenry. This is so not only because of their physical proximity to 
the problem but also because of their special expertise in dealing with 
the governmental issues that come to their attention. Only the realist 
approach of the penalty Justices, which recognizes the practical 
consequences of government burdens on public employees' constitutional 
rights, pe1mits these employees to cany out their essential role. 
B. Constitutional Balancing as an Antidote to 
Neoformalist Reasoning 
As discussed above, Garcetti's government speech doctrine has the 
ability to wreak havoc on public employees' remaining constitutional 
rights in a large subcategory of public employee free speech cases by 
taking away public employees' Pickering rights?" By writing broad job 
descriptions, government employers can claim that they are disciplining 
employees only for govetrunent speech by employees. Because employees 
can claim no constitutional protection for such speech, employers are 
free to sanction employees who write or speak in a way that is not in the 
best interest of Lheir employer? in other words, this is exactly the theory 
of law that existed prior to ? ? ? development of the Pickering doctrine. 
In this regard recall the ourt maj ri ty in Garcelli found ballo did 
not have Fir t Amendment right b cau e the speech at is ue ' ow [d] its 
existence to [his] professional responsibilities" and "simply reflects the 
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created."212 In making this point, the Court-in a 
parenthetical-draws language from the case of Rosenbe?ger v. Rector 
curiam) ("The Court has recogni zed the right of employee to peak on matters of public 
concern, typica lly matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the 
public at large, a subject on which public employees arc uniquely qualified to 
comment"). 
2 11. ee Garce???, 547 U .. at 4 8 ( outer, J., di scnting) ("The ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of th 
???????? s reliance on Rosenb ?rger' under ??????? of Rust doctrine .. . portend? a 
bloated notion of c ntrollable government speech going well beyond the circumstances 
of this cas .' ): ee al o id. ? ? 437 ( .. Rust i n authority for the n tion ???? the 
gove??? ·nt may exercise plenary control over every commcut made by ? public empl ye? in 
doing his job."). 
212. See id. at 421 - 22 (majority opinion). 
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& Visitors of University of Virginia, 213 which stated that "when the 
government appropriates public funds to promote a pa????????policy of 
its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."214 This language in turn was 
taken from similar language in the abortion-funding case of Rust v. 
Sullivan,215 which, of course, relies on neoformalistic reasoning? 16 
The solution to this neofonnalist approach is to push for more 
standards and balancing of interests than bright-line rules. Consider that 
Judge Po ner d Lines legal fo???1ism a "enabling a commentator to 
pronounce the outcome of the case a being conect or incorrect in 
approximately the ame way that lhe olution to a math matical problem 
can be pronounced a c rrect or incorrect."217 Of cour e a Judge Noonan 
has pointed out, what i l s t in uch a mecbani tic approach to the law i 
that the problem of real people become 'gri t for the con titutional 
mill. ,218 
A practical, realist approach, on the other hand, has judges decide the 
case so that the decision attempts to promote the public welfare. Given 
the inevitable conflict of interest between employee speech rights and 
employer efficiency intere t in th se public employment free speech 
cases, the constitutional balan ing et out by Pickering is perfectly 
suited to provide an outcome ba ed on Lhe pecific circumstances of 
different cases. In thi, vein, Justice Blackmun suggested in the Rust 
case that constitutional balancing of relevant interests would lead away 
from a conclusion that was "insensitive and contrary to common human 
experience. "219 
Rather than blindly following a neoforrnalist analysis, which 
asks whether a formal opportunity exists in another forum to exercise 
constitutional rights, all in the service of more predictable rules, the 
realist approach of constitutional balancing is consistent with notions of 
social justice. It is also consistent with the penalty approach to the 
213. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
214. Garcelti, 547 U.S. at 422; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
215. Rustv. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,174-75 (1991). 
216. See id. at 192-93 ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment favoring 
childbit1h over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds."' (quoting Maher v. Roc, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))). 
2 17. ee Posner, supra note147,at l 1.
2 18. OONAN supra note 146, at 144 ("For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it 
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases wi th an agenda, the facts are of minor
importance and the person affected arc w rthy of almo st no altcntion. . . . The people 
nnd their problems that have been gri t for the constitutionnl mill arc incidental."). 
2 19. One of the approaches that Justice Blackmun suggest in hi dissent in Rust is 
bala.ncing t h e govemment' interest in promoting a certain type of family planning 
against the First Ameodment.rights of doctors and the Fifth Amendment substant ive due 
process rights o f pregnant women. See Rust 500 U .. at 213- 14 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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unconstitutional condition do trine in requiring judge to pra ctically
consider the actua l impact that penaliziug employee ' free . peech will 
have on their constitutional rights. P rhap mo t importantly it huts the 
door on the reemerging neoforma li t-in pired right-priv ilege distinction of a 
long-ago discredited age. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Neoformalism has slowly insinuated itself into the unconstitutional 
condition doctrine over the years, without many commentators noticing 
the large role it now plays in substantially reducing the constitutional 
1ights of all sorts of individuals, but perhap especially public employ es. 
Through the use of the subsidy line of argument under the do trine of 
unconstitutional conditions, the notion advanced by the majority in Garcetti 
is that public employee speech is nothing more than government speech 
when these employees speak pursuant to their official duties. In this 
manner, neoformalism has wreaked havoc on the Pickering doctrine and 
reinvigorated the right-privilege distinction in constitutional law. A 
fonnal opportunity to exercise a con titutional right is simply not the same 
thing as the practical ability to exerci e tho rights . 
This neoformalistic approach adopted by the majority in Garcetti is 
contrary to good government. Without the ability of public servants to 
bring to light govermnent's baser practices without jeopardizing their 
careers, all citizens suffer from the resulting lack of government 
transparency and accountability. This is especially so at a time when it is 
harder for ordinary citizens to keep track of all the myriad depattments 
that make up federal, state, and local government. In fact, Garcetti's 
pigeonholing of public employees as mere employees does not comport 
with how most employees view themselves. Nor does it comport with 
the reality of the modern public workplace, where employee-citizens 
discuss and speak out on issues of public concem as a matter of course. 
This Article therefore argues in favor of reestablishing First Amendment 
protections for public employees who speak out on matters of public 
concern. Such employees should not have to rely on statutmy whistle-
blowing or civil service protection which may not protect tl1eir pecific 
activity and which, unlike the First Am .ndment may nol apply to all 
levels of government and to all jurisdictions. lnstead Garcetti' overbroad 
government speech doctrine must be limited to appropriate cases in 
which employees are actually hired to transmit a specific govemment 
message. This necessary doctrinal transformation can be accomplished 
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through a recommitment to Pickering's penalty version of the doctrine 
ofunconstitutional conditions, with its emphasis on constitutional balancing 
and a recognition that employees should not always have to relinquish 
vital constitutional rights in order to enjoy the benefits of public 
employment. 
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